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I. INTRODUCTION
Fifteen years have elapsed since Congress passed the Bankruptcy
Reform Act in 1978,1 and a dozen years have passed since Professor
Richard F. Duncan published "Through the Trap Door Darkly: Ne-
braska Exemption Policy and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978."2
That article constitutes the acknowledged treatise on Nebraska ex-
emptions. Due to the timing of its publication and the relative new-
ness of the law, Duncan cited only one Nebraska bankruptcy case
decided under the Bankruptcy Code. In the interim, the Nebraska
Bankruptcy Court has rendered nearly a thousand reported decisions.
Since that time significant bankruptcy-related activity has tran-
spired. The Nebraska state exemptions have been repeatedly
amended: in 1980,3 1981,4 1986,5 1987,6 and twice in 1993.7 Ne-
braska has grudgingly increased its homestead exemption,8 reduced
the annuity exemption, 9 created new exemptions for pensions and
lump-sum and structured settlements,1 0 and almost lost all of the ex-
emptions for debtors filing bankruptcy.
The federal Bankruptcy Code has been in continual flux as a result
of direct legislative amendment and the volume of emerging case law.
Under the Code, the national and Nebraska bankruptcy court
caseload grew substantially, especially in the area of consumer
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2459 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
2. Richard F. Duncan, Through The Trap Door Darkly: Nebraska Exemption Policy
and The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 60 NaB. L. REv. 219 (1981).
3. L.B. 940, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1980).
4. L.B. 327, 87th Leg., 1st Sess. (1981).
5. L.B. 999, 89th Leg., 2d Sess. (1986).
6. L.B. 335, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (1987).
7. L.B. 118, 93d Leg., 1st Sess. (1993); L.B. 458, 93d Leg., 1st Sess. (1993).
8. L.B. 999, 89th Leg., 2d Sess. (1986).
9. For a discussion of the changes in Nebraska's annuity exemption laws, see infra
notes 116-143 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 169-174 and accompanying text.
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cases. 1 ' The introduction of Chapter 12 for the family farmer also in-
creased Nebraska's caseload due to the significant amount of agricul-
tural activity within the state.12 In September 1987, the court
expanded from one judge in Omaha to include a second judge sitting
in Lincoln.13 The bankruptcy court, district court, Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals and U.S. Supreme Court have rendered several deci-
sions that further explicate the interaction between the Bankruptcy
Code and state exemptions.
11. Filings by year and chapter:
Total Total
Neb USA
1978 201,944
1979 1625 225,549
1980 2831 331,098
1981 2527 363,847
1982 2271 380,212
1983 2197 348,872
1984 2547 348,488
1985 3016 412,431
1986 3714 530,008
1987 3779 (Om. 3450, Linc. 329) 574,849
Omaha Lincoln Total Total Total Omaha Lincoln NEB Total USA
Ch. 7 Ch. 7 Ch. 9 Ch. 11 Ch. 12 Ch. 13 Ch. 13
1988 1442 965 4 84 152 519 172 3338 613,606
1989 1266 1159 3 63 70 611 216 3388 679,980
1990 1224 1275 2 68 86 1015 367 4037 782,960
1991 1497 1504 4 64 71 975 404 4519 943,987
1992 1560 1430 2 57 97 603 436 4158 900,874
1993 1466 1286 1 46 59 605 199 3662 918,734
*1994 787 660 0 9 22 246 82 1806 Unavail.
*(first 6 months of 1994)
Robert S. Cooper, A Statistical Analysis of Chapter 13 Usage Before and After the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 1985 ANN. SuRv. BAXR. L. 399; 8 AM. BANaIU
INsT. NEWSLETMER Sep.-Oct. 1989, at 8; 11 Newsletter Apr. 1992, at 25.
12. The Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustee, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 3088 (1986). The legislation was en-
acted on October 27, 1986 and became effective on November 26, 1986.
13. Two opinions exist regarding the precedential authority of unpublished decisions.
Judge Mahoney, relying on In re Anderson, 50 B.R. 728, 732 (D. Neb. 1985), be-
lieves that unpublished decisions may be cited. Judge Minahan, on the other
hand, follows In re Leimer, 724 F.2d 744, 745 (8th Cir. 1984), which states "un-
published opinions of this Court are not intended to create binding precedent,"
and Eighth Circuit Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 28A(k), which states in
part that "[n]o party may cite a federal or state court opinion not intended for
publication." It appears that Judge Minahan deems decisions appearing solely in
the Legal Information Service publication, Nebraska Bankruptcy Opinions, [here-
inafter Neb. Bkr. yr:pagel, as unpublished opinions, while Judge Mahoney treats
them as published decisions. Conversation between the Judges, Bankruptcy Sec-
tion of the Nebraska State Bar Association, Annual Convention, Omaha, October
13, 1993. See also In re Shubert, 147 B.R. 618, 619 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992)(citing
Fox v. Acadia State Bank, 937 F.2d 1566, 1570 (11th Cir. 1991)).
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This Article not only supplements and updates Duncan's analysis
in light of the subsequent amendments and case law but also advo-
cates an exemption agenda for future consideration. This Article con-
cludes that the solution lies in legislative amendment and
recommends that the state adopt a system of debtor-creditor relations
that meets requirements of justice and compassion.
Historically, Nebraska and other state legislatures periodically re-
view exemptions and amend them to conform with contemporary use
and practice. 14 The Bankruptcy Reform Act permits states either to
use the federal exemptions pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) or opt out
and substitute state exemptions.15 Nebraska opted out with the Act
of April 16, 1980, and enacted Legislative Bill 940.16 Although this
legislation prohibited Nebraska citizens from using the congressional
scheme of exemptions, it raised Nebraska's homestead exemption
from $4,000 to $6,50017 and increased the "in lieu of homestead" ex-
emption from $1,500 to $2,500.18 Nonetheless, with minor exceptions,
"Nebraska's exemptions are dramatically less generous than the ex-
emptions afforded debtors under the Federal Bankruptcy Code."'19
14. TERESA A. SULIVAN, ET AL., As WE FORGIVE OuR DEBTORS: BANxauPTcY AND
CONSU MR CREDrr iN AMERmCA 28 (1989).
In 1969, NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1556 (Reissue 1969) was modernized to its cur-
rent form. The updated section shed the traditional, rural and archaic specific
exemptions, such as the Family Bible; family pictures; school books; seat or pew
in any house or place of public worship; all beds, bedsteads and bedding neces-
sary for family use; all stoves and appendages, not to exceed $100; one cow, three
hogs, and all pigs under 6 months, if the debtor was in the agricultural business;
one yoke of oxen or a pair of horses in lieu thereof; 10 sheep and their wool; one
wagon, cart or dray; 2 plows and one drag, which had been allowed as exemp-
tions. The $500 exemption was raised to $1,000 in 1969 and to $1,500 in 1973.
Section 25-1556 has not been amended since 1973. Section 25-1552 was raised
from $500 to $1,500 in 1973 and to $2,500 in 1981. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1552
(Cum. Supp. 1993).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)(1988).
16. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-15,105 (Reissue 1989) provides as follows:
The federal exemptions provided in 11 U.S.C. Section 522, subsection
(d), are hereby rejected by the State of Nebraska. The State of Nebraska
elects to retain the personal exemptions provided under Nebraska stat-
utes and the Nebraska Constitution and to have such exemptions apply
to any bankruptcy petition filed in Nebraska after April 17, 1980.
Thirty-four other jurisdictions also opted to maintain or amend their state ex-
emptions, or permit their citizens to elect state or federal exemptions, rather
than allow them to use solely the federal exemptions.
17. Duncan, supra note 2, at 233 n.63 (citing NEB. Rev. STAT. § 40-101 (Cum. Supp.
1980)).
18. Duncan, supra note 2, at 233 n.64 (citing NEB. Rev. STAT. § 25-1552 (Cum. Supp.
1980)).
19. Paul Festerson, Nebraska Exemptions, The Annuity Brouhaha and LB 335, 2
(Neb. Continuing Legal Education 1987). Duncan approved the choice of state
over federal exemptions: "The disparity between federal and Nebraska's exemp-
tions gives rise to one positive effect of Nebraska's opting out of the federal
19941
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A comparative review of the parallels, harmony, and dissonance
between federal and state exemptions is instructive. The passage of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 doubled the federal exemptions
established in 1978, which, with few exceptions, were already more
generous than Nebraska. Moreover, the Reform Act provides triennial
review of exemption levels based on the Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers published by the Department of Labor.20 Some of
Nebraska's exemptions have been expanded, such as the section 40-
101 homestead and structured settlements, while other areas, such as
section 44-371, have been narrowed. The expansions result both from
altered federal exemptions and a recognition that the exemptions are
not keeping pace with inflation. The narrowing is in reaction to per-
ceived abuses of exemptions. Furthermore, the Unicameral has re-
acted to a changing economic, political, and social climate. In this new
environment, pension plans are becoming a predominant form of long
term investment, and structured settlements in personal injury cases
scheme-the elimination of an incentive for debtors to rush into bankruptcy in
order to take advantage of the more generous federal exemptions." Duncan, supra
note 2, at 234 n.65. Nebraska "has always been a creditor driven and a creditor
oriented state" and "reject[ed all the federal exemptions. We are going to reject
exemptions because they are far more liberal than this state could ever tolerate
and allow." See FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 335, 90TH LEG., iST SEsS. 3658 (1987)(re-
marks of Sen. V. Johnson). Committee hearings and Unicameral debates are re-
plete with attorney and debtor bashing.
20. The federal exemption structure is as follows:
(1) Homestead exemption - $15,000 per debtor and for joint debtors, $30,000;
(2) Motor vehicle - $2,400;
(3) Personal property $400 per item, aggregate $8,000;
(4) Jewelry - $1,000;
(5) any property - $800 plus up to $7,500 of any unused amount from (1);
(6) tools of trade - $1,500;
(7) any unmatured life insurance contract;
(8) life insurance - $8,000;
(9) health aids;
(10) (A) social security, unemployment compensation;
(B) veterans' benefits;
(C) disability, illness or unemployment;
(D) alimony, support or separate maintenance;
(E) stock bonus, pension, profitsharing, annuity, or similar plan or contract
on account of illness, disability, death, age or length of service, to the
extent reasonably necessary for the support of debtor and any
dependent;
(11) (A) award under a crime victim's reparation law;
(B) wrongful death award;
(C) life insurance;
(D) $15,000 personal injury award;
(E) future lost income award;
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 5116, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. Sec. 108(d)-(e) (enacted
Oct. 22, 1994) (amending § 522(d) and providing for future adjustments at a three-year
interval commencing April 1, 1998).
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have become a mutually agreeable economic resolution, sometimes
preferable to lump sum payment.
The disparity between the federal and state exemptions results in
unequal treatment of Nebraska citizens in comparison to citizens of
states that apply the federal exemptions or have more generous opt
out provisions.21 For example, under the federal exemptions, a mar-
ried couple with a homestead and other tangible personal property22
could claim exempt property totaling $56,600 while a similarly situ-
ated Nebraska couple applying Nebraska exemptions could only claim
$18,500. Absent the homestead, the federal exemptions provide
$43,200 in exempt property; Nebraska only exempts $11,000. For a
single person, the federal exemptions, including a homestead, provide
$14,350 of exemption. Under Nebraska exemptions, a single person
who is neither married nor head of family at the time the home was
acquired, and did not subsequently marry or become head of house-
hold, cannot claim a homestead exemption and is limited to $5,500 in
exempt property. If Nebraska permitted a person living alone to claim
a homestead, the exemption would be $13,000, still far less than the"
federal exemption.23
Since several Nebraska exemptions overlap and interact, they can-
not be discussed in isolation, particularly in a joint bankruptcy.24 For
example, In re Dahlberg25 established that a debtor (husband) and
joint debtor (wife) could both claim exemptions under the general per-
sonal property provision,26 and under the in-lieu-of-homestead provi-
sion,27 which totals $8,000. The in-lieu-of-homestead provision, also
commonly called the wildcard 28 exemption, interacts directly with the
homestead exemption29 and personal property provision.30 Where the
husband claimed the homestead under section 40-101, the wife could
21. See infra Parts I, IV, X XI.
22. This does not include pensions or any items in (7) through (11)).
23. The 1978 federal exemptions represent a compromise between the Senate and
House versions. The House Bill exemptions were substantially higher. For in-
stance, the House homestead exemption was $10,000, the vehicle exemption was
$1,500, the jewelry exemption was $750, and tools exemption was $1,000, per
debtor. See REPORT OF THE COMMrrrEE ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TivEs, H.R. REP. No. 595, 95TH CONG., IST SESs. 361 (1977); 140 CONG. REC.
H10,765 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (Rep. Brooks inserting section-by-section descrip-
tion of Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994).
24. A husband and wife may file a joint bankruptcy with the husband being the
debtor and the wife the joint debtor.
25. Neb. Bkr. 79:75, 75-76.
26. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1556 (Reissue 1989).
27. Id. § 25-1552 (Reissue 1989).
28. In re Welborne, 63 B.R. 23, 26 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986). See also Duncan, supra
note 2, at 266.
29. NEB. REv. STAT. § 40-101 (Reissue 1989).
30. Id. § 25-1556 (Reissue 1989).
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claim the in-lieu-of-homestead under section 25-1552.31 The charac-
ter of the property exempted under section 25-1552 and the general
personal property provision may be identical, with section 25-1552 be-
ing applied for the values that exceed the section 25-1556 general per-
sonal property limitations. Additionally, in Patterson v. Shumate,32
the United States Supreme Court may have simplified or compounded
the interplay between the pension exemption3 3 and the annuity
exemption.3 4
II. INTERACTION BETWEEN STATE EXEMPTIONS AND
FEDERAL DISCHARGE
While the scope of the exemption is fixed by state law, the debtor's
right to discharge is determined by federal law. Filing for bankruptcy
includes the obligation of listing all the debtor's property and claiming
appropriate exemptions. As simple as it sounds, this process is subject
to an increasing number of pitfalls and a lack of predictability.
A. Pre-bankruptcy Planning
Determining when the conversion of nonexempt assets to exempt
assets enters the zone of danger on the eve of bankruptcy is problem-
atic and potentially unpredictable. Debtor's counsel should thought-
fully engage in pre-bankruptcy planning and zealously claim
exemptions. The tension between preserving assets and giving the
creditors their due, the tension between providing a fresh start or
head start, and counsel's ethical duty to prepare the client for bank-
ruptcy has received a considerable amount of attention.
Eve of bankruptcy conversions are not fraudulent per se. However,
11 U.S.C. § 727(a) provides "[t]he court shall grant the debtor a dis-
charge, unless (2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a
creditor... has transferred, removed... or concealed (A) property of
the debtor, within one year before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion."35 And while 11 U.S.C. § 548 provides a one year moratorium on
fraudulent conveyances, at least one jurisdiction has held that 11
U.S.C. § 522 may permit inquiry and invalidation of exemptions in the
face of fraud for periods extending longer than one year prior to
filing.36
31. In re Nachtigal, 82 B.R. 533, 534-35 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988); In re Hartman, 19
B.R. 844, 845-46 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982).
32. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
33. NEB. Rxv. STAT. § 25-1563.01 (Reissue 1989).
34. Id. § 44-371 (Reissue 1993).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1988)(emphasis added).
36. In re Coplan, 156 B.R. 88, 91-92 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993). See infra notes 56 and
265 and accompanying text.
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An early commentator has written that "[b]ankruptcy legislation
and state exemption laws were not designed to protect the debtor who
acts in bad faith to deprive his creditors of assets."37 The Eighth Cir-
cuit addressed how much is too much and under what circumstances
acquisition is tainted in three cases. In Norwest Bank of Nebraska v.
Tveten,38 a fifty-nine-year-old Minnesota physician with $19,000,000
in obligations liquidated non-exempt assets and converted $700,000
into life insurance or annuity contracts. He even liquidated his ex-
empt home for $50,000. The court found extrinsic evidence of intent to
defraud and denied discharge. However, Tveten was "entitled to re-
tain, free from creditors' claims, property rightfully exempt under rel-
evant state law."3 9 Judge Arnold dissented on the basis that the court
had entered the realm of the legislative branch by interposing its judi-
cial interpretation of state law which had created an unlimited
exemption. 40
In Hanson v. First National Bank in Brookings,41 a South Dakota
farmer purchased life insurance with a cash surrender value of
$19,955. South Dakota law provided a maximum exemption of
$20,000 in life insurance policies.4 2 Hanson was a farmer, not a phy-
sician. His debts and the scope of his pre-bankruptcy planning were
on a far smaller scale than Tveten's. The conversion was permitted
and discharge granted. 43 Judge Arnold wrote a separate concurring
opinion.44
In re Johnson4 5 is the last of the trilogy. Johnson was a forty-
three-year-old Minnesota physician who had invested along with
Tveten. In Johnson, the bankruptcy court and district court held that
a Minnesota physician, who "made a conscious, if selfish, effort to fully
avail himself of the full range of debtor protections afforded by the
Minnesota state legislature ... [in a] wholly self-serving" manner,
37. Alan N. Resnick, Prudent Planning or Fraudulent Transfer? The Use of Nonex-
empt Assets to Purchase or Improve Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 31
RUTGERS L. REV. 615, 638 (1978). See also Paxton v. Sutton, 53 Neb. 81, 84, 73
N.W. 221 (1897), cited in Henry H. Foster, The Nebraska Homestead, 3 NEB. L.
BULL. 109, 156 (1924).
38. 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988).
39. Id. at 876.
40. Id. at 878-79.
41. 848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988). Judge Arnold, who dissented in Norwest Bank of
Nebraska v. Tveten, wrote a separate concurring opinion in Hanson. He opposed
the court's interposing its subjective opinion in the face of clear statute, and as-
serted it was the state legislature's role to impose limits on nonexempt property
transfer. See Norwest Bank of Nebraska v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 877 (8th Cir.
1988)(Arnold, J., dissenting); Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank in Brookings, 848 F.2d
866, 870 (8th Cir. 1988)(Arnold, J., concurring).
42. S.D. CoDIFIE LAws ANN. § 58-12-4 (1978).
43. Hanson v. First Nat'l Bank in Brookings, 848 F.2d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 1988).
44. Id. at 870-71.
45. 880 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1989).
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with which the court had "gut-level difficulty," did nothing to merit
denial of discharge. 46 The bankruptcy court decided Johnson before
Tveten and Hanson, but the Eighth Circuit decided it after Tveten and
Hanson. The Eighth Circuit remanded Johnson to the bankruptcy
court. On remand, the bankruptcy court merged Tveten and Hanson
into a seven-pronged test for fraud, which compared the reasons that
the debtor claimed the exemption against the legislative purpose for
establishing the exemption. 47 The court found intrinsic fraud based
on the claimed exemption of a life insurance policy which was ac-
quired shortly before filing bankruptcy and cashed in shortly thereaf-
ter. The debtor also claimed an exemption for a grand piano and
harpsichord valued at $8,000 when he was not even able to play the
instruments. The court denied discharge.48
The adage that pigs get fed while hogs get slaughtered appropri-
ately summarizes the growing literature and case law.49 Professor
Resnick suggests that "[slo long as his purpose is to obtain a reason-
able amount of property to fulfill his genuine needs, such acquisitions
can be considered as part of the debtor's prudent planning.So
Professor Resnick has articulated five often cited policy premises
for exemptions:
(1) To provide the debtor with property necessary for his physical survival;
(2) To protect the dignity and the cultural and religious identity of the debtor;
(3) To enable the debtor to rehabilitate himself financially and earn income in
the future;
(4) To protect the debtor's family from the adverse consequences of
impoverishment;
(5) To shift the burden of providing the debtor and his family with minimal
support from society to the debtor's creditors. 5 1
Professor Duncan suggests that "the starting point for the debtor's
counsel is clear-the specific exemptions are to be liberally construed
46. In re Johnson, 80 B.R. 953, 961, 963 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
47. In re Johnson, 124 B.R. 290, 292-95 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
48. Id. at 297.
49. See Lloyd D. Colwell, Jr., The Debtor and Conversion of Nonexempt Assets to Ex-
empt Assets on the Eve of Bankruptcy: Astute Bankruptcy Estate Planning or
Fraud, 18 CAP. U. L. R. 567 (1989); J. T. Hardin, Bankruptcy Planning: Risks of
Converting Nonexempt Property to Exempt Property on the Eve of Bankruptcy, 12
OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 279 (1987); Paul G. Hyman, Jr., Prebankruptcy Planning:
Conversion of Nonexempt Assets into Exempt Assets, 21 CoLO. LAw. 231 (1992);
James A. Lodoen, Pitfalls of Pre-Bankruptcy Planning: Preserving Assets and the
Discharge, 69 N. DAY L. REV. 93 (1993); Note, First Texas Savings Association v.
Reed (In re Reed): Conversion of Non-Exempt Assets Into Exempt Homestead on
the Eve of Bankruptcy, 24 S. TEx L.J. 909 (1983); Note, Use of the Texas Home-
stead Exemption to Shelter Assets in Bankruptcy May Bar Discharge: First Texas
Savings Assoc. v. Reed, 14 Tax L. REv. 648 (1983).
50. Resnick, supra note 37, at 643.
51. Resnick, supra note 37, at 621. See Norwest Bank of Neb. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d
871, 876 (8th Cir. 1988).
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in favor of the person claiming the exemption."52 However, in In re
Loftis,53 the court sounded a cautionary note. In that case, the debt-
ors were not completely honest in their dealings with the creditor.
The court ruled that "honesty in fact and full disclosure are the very
heart and soul of good faith."54
Correctly applying the appropriate exemptions cannot be overem-
phasized. 55 While Tveten, Hanson, and Johnson provide some gui-
dance on pre-bankruptcy conversion, they may exaggerate the risk of
pre-bankruptcy planning in Nebraska where the exemptions are al-
ready so lean. However, a debtor fleeing Nebraska to a jurisdiction
with luxuriant exemptions may run into a "Coplan analysis." In In re
Coplan,56 although the debtor relied on advice of counsel and the plain
reading of the statutes, the creditors persuaded the court that Wiscon-
sin's exemptions were nonetheless applicable rather than those of the
new host state. The court found a "systematic conversion of assets
had occurred ... for the specific purpose of placing the asset out of
reach of creditors."5 7 Judge Arnold, dissenting in Tueten, disagreed
with such an approach, and observed that a state legislative enact-
ment relied on by a debtor in another jurisdiction should not be over-
ruled by a court.5 8
B. Concealment of Assets
The penalty for failing to list all of the debtor's property may be
severe. One adage indicates that the difference between tax avoidance
and tax evasion is between five to ten years.5 9 The court has a low
tolerance level for debtors seeking a safe harbor in bankruptcy who do
not completely and adequately describe what it is they hold. In In re
Hohnholt,60 a debtor was denied discharge after having failed to dis-
close his insurance renewal income.6 1 Under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a), a
debtor is entitled to a discharge unless the debtor knowingly and
52. Duncan, supra note 2, at 267.
53. Neb. Bkr. 90:59.
54. Id. at 61.
55. In re Smith, 143 B.R. 912 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1992). See Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz,
112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992). In Taylor, Justice Thomas states in dicta that debtors and
their attorneys may be subject to Rule 9011 and possible criminal penalties for
fraud for improperly claiming exemptions. Id. at 1648. See also Gary Klein, Giv-
ing Your Client a Fresh Start: New Supreme Court Decisions Highlights the Ex-
emption Process in Bankruptcy, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE Rav. 906 (1992).
56. 156 B.R. 88 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
57. Id. at 90.
58. Norwest Bank of Neb. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 877-78 (Arnold J., dissenting).
59. More precisely, the penalty for fraudulently concealing assets is $5,000 and/or
five years imprisonment. 18 U.S.C. § 152 (1988).
60. Neb. Bkr 91:362.
61. Id. at 363. See also In re Mertz, 955 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1992)(holding failure to
disclose estate tax refund was material misrepresentation warranting denial of
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fraudulently made a false oath or statement in connection with the
case. In In re Lundy,62 the "drastic remedy" of denying a discharge
resulted when the debtors' testimony regarding their sources of cash
lacked credibility and was "nonsense." The debtors had several oppor-
tunities to set the record straight but failed to do so. The trustee's
objection to the exempt homestead was denied.6 3 Although the un-
listed property may be of inconsequential value or even exempt, fail-
ure to list it could result in denial of discharge. Failure to list
contingent claims such as personal injury, malpractice, consumer
fraud, unfair debt collection, or an uncollected personal debt could also
result in the loss of the claim on the theory that the discharged debtor/
plaintiff did not have clean hands to pursue the claim since it was not
listed as an asset in the bankruptcy. Furthermore, reopening the case
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350 to correct the omission is not an auto-
matic right.
Bankruptcy fraud and crimes have received increased scrutiny
from the U.S. Trustee. The court, the trustee, and the U.S. Trustee
may refer questionable practices to the U.S. Attorney for investigation
and possible grand jury indictment and prosecution. These sanctions
clearly go beyond the denial of exemptions or discharge. For example,
in a recent case, an attorney who advised a debtor to hide assets had
his sentence enhanced under the Sentencing Guidelines because the
lawyer had "special skills."64
C. Valuation
Establishing the value of property is an art. The vast majority of
debtors cannot afford a professional appraiser. The value of exempt
and non-exempt property focuses on the legal standard to be applied
and the purpose of the valuation.65 The issue is important because in
the current scheme all exemptions contain limits on the value of desig-
nated property the debtor may claim.
Determining the value of potentially exempt property is governed
by section 522(a)(2) which provides that "value" means "fair market
value."6 6 Standards for arriving at fair market value may include re-
placement value, insurance value, retail price, wholesale price, auc-
discharge); In re Rott, 955 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1992); In re Olson, 96 B.R. 944
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1988).
62. 100 B.R. 502 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989).
63. Id. at 503-09.
64. See Use of Bankruptcy Knowledge Lands Lawyer in Prison, 3 CONSUMER BANKE.
NEws 1, 8 (January 10, 1994).
65. Arnold B. Cohen, The Standard for Valuing an Undersecured Creditor's Collat-
eral in Chapter 13 Cases, 2 J. BANcm L. & PRAc. 761 (1992); Richardo I. Kilpa-
trick, Creditors Corner - Valuation Determination, 5 NACTT Q. 13 (Jan. 1993).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a)(2)(1988).
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tion or distress sale value, pawnshop price, or garage sale price.67 In
In re Sato,68 the court distinguished between fair market value and
liquidation value. The court recognized "the forced sale nature of a
trustee sale" could result in a "decline in the sale price" but without
further evidence was unwilling to accept that the decline would be
twenty to forty percent.6 9 Value, for the purposes of Chapter 13 liqui-
dation analysis, is that amount which the trustee in Chapter 7 would
have available to disburse to creditors following liquidation and its
inherent costs. 7 0
When secured property is retained or subject to cramdown, section
506(a) of the Code dealing with secured claims provides that "value
shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and of the
proposed disposition of use of such property."71 The legislative history
indicates "that the concept of value is flexible and grants discretion to
the courts to determine value on a case-by-case basis."72 Competing
perspectives are represented by the wholesale price and commercially
reasonable sale price. The central issue is what amount the creditor
would realize if the property were disposed of in a bid market.73
The circuits are split on which standard to apply when valuing as-
sets. The Ninth Circuit, in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mitch-
ell,74 placed value at the property's wholesale price. Judge Noonan
dissented, recognizing that valuation is neither simple nor unambigu-
ous and the statutory language should be controlling. He would have
established value at the retail price of replacement.75 On the other
hand, the Fourth Circuit relies on the debtor's intended use of the
67. The Nebraska Legislature has recognized the difficulty of valuation. "[T]he value
of a piece of property can vary considerably to different individuals under differ-
ent considerations and under different marketing conditions." See FLOOR DEBATE
ON L.B. 335, 90TH LEG., IST SESs. 2573 (1987)(remarks of Sen. Schmit).
68. Neb. Bkr. 88:655.
69. Id. at 656.
70. See Appendix, Neb. Loc. Bankr. Rules, Chap. 13, Form 13-A. See also BFP v.
Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct. 1757 (1994) (interpreting "reasonably
equivalent value" under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(2) as the price in fact received at a
foreclosure sale).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1988).
72. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.CJAN. 5787. See In re Klein, 10 B.R. 657, 659 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
73. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C-A.N. 5787. See In re Klein, 10 B.R. 657, 659 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
Analogously, the redemption provision under 11 U.S.C. § 722 was designed "to
give the debtor the first right to purchase property which would otherwise simply
be repossessed and sold to someone else." See In re McQuinn, 6 B.R. 899, 900
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1980)(citing H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 380-81(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.N. 5787, 6336).
74. 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 303 (1992).
75. Id. at 561 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
19941
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
property.76 The Supreme Court has thus far denied certiorari to re-
solve the split. Perhaps Supreme Court review has been denied be-
cause the legislative history anticipated a case-by-case analysis. 7 7
Recently, In re Stauffer78 has further muddied the water by com-
bining the approaches. In Stauffer, the court concluded that "the most
equitable approach [in valuing property]... would seem to... aver-
age the two figures," the NADA wholesale and retail values, to fix the
value of a motor vehicle in a Chapter 13.79
Flagrantly violating good sense in the valuation process could re-
sult in sanctions under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011.
In In re Ridner,80 the debtor and counsel grossly undervalued jewelry
at $200 when a pawnshop estimated a minimum value of $1,800 and a
retail replacement cost of $4,650. The attorney was sanctioned $800
as a result of the undervaluation. Rule 9011 provides in part that an
attorney's signature on a document represents that the attorney has
read the document and the claim "is well grounded in fact and is war-
ranted by existing law or a good faith argument." Violation of the rule
may result in "an appropriate sanction."8 1
D. Amending Exemptions
In In re Welborne,82 debtors were permitted to amend their exemp-
tions after they had received a discharge.8 3 The court found that the
rule did not establish a clear deadline for amending the list of prop-
erty claimed as exempt and overruled the creditors' reliance on the
doctrine of laches.8 4
E. Case Conversion and Onset of Exemption
When debtors convert from Chapter 11 or 13 to 7, a question fre-
quently arises as to from what date the exemptions derive. Generally,
exemptions taken in the initial case prevail. For instance, if the case
was filed when the homestead exemption was $6,500, but upon con-
version to Chapter 7 the exemption was $10,000, the debtor's exemp-
tion is limited to $6,500. However, if the property was sold while the
initial case was pending and no longer in the debtor's possession and a
76. In re Balbus, 933 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1991).
77. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN.
5787, 5854.
78. 141 B.R. 612 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
79. Id. at 614.
80. 19 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 59 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1989).
81. See FED. R. BANxx. P. § 9011(a).
82. 63 B.R. 23 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986).
83. See also In re Freudenburg, Neb. Bkr. 86:382 (allowing debtors amended list of
claimed exemptions after bank failed to object).
84. In re Welborne, 63 B.R. 23, 25 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986).
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substitute homestead was not acquired, then the debtors would be en-
titled to a section 40-101 exemption for the replacement homestead or
entitled to a section 25-1552 in-lieu-of-homestead exemption.8 5
F. Objecting to Exemptions
In a case where a trustee's objection to an exemption was imper-
fectly served, both parties appealed to the district court, where Judge
Cambridge's decisionS6 anticipated the Supreme Court ruling in Tay-
lor v. Freeland & Kronz.87 The court reversed on the basis that
"Bankruptcy Rule 4003 provides that objections to exemptions must
be filed within 30 days of the first meeting of the creditors unless
within that 30 days, the court grants an extension of time to object."8s
The court found that the bankruptcy court had "erroneously relied
upon the 'relation back' theory."89 Thus, "the debtor's claim of exemp-
tion should be affirmed for the reason that the objection was not
timely fied in accordance with Bankruptcy Rule 4003."90
G. The IRS and Nebraska Exemptions
Nebraska exemptions do not apply when the United States is a
creditor. The IRS has established its own set standards for property
exempt from levy. These exemptions include wearing apparel, school
books, fuel, provisions, furniture and personal effects up to $1,650,
books and tools of the trade that do not exceed $1,100 in value, and
other streams of income.91 "Exemptions under state law are not valid
against a tax lien except to the extent provided by 26 U.S.C.
§ 6334(a)."92 If the IRS has a secured claim, the most the debtor can
do is reduce the secured portion to the value of the secured property
with the balance becoming unsecured or priority. It is important to
note that lien avoidance under section 522(f)(1) is directed toward ju-
85. See e.g., In re Lindberg, 735 F.2d 1087 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Beethe, Neb. Bkr.
87:259.
86. Nuttleman v. Myers, 128 B.R. 234 (D. Neb. 1991).
87. 112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992). See also In re Freudenburg, Neb. Bkr. 86:382 (allowing
debtors amended list of claimed exemptions after bank failed to object).
88. Nuttleman v. Myers, 128 B.R. 254, 255-56 (D. Neb. 1991).
89. Id. at 256.
90. Id. See also Klein, supra note 55; Arend R. Baack, Exemptions, Neb. Continuing
Legal Education, Fundamentals of Bankruptcy (December 10, 1993).
91. I.R.C. § 6334(a)-(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The exempt amount is periodically
increased. For example, section 6334(a)(2), fuel, provisions, furniture, and per-
sonal effects exemption, which is only available if the taxpayer is the head of a
family, has risen from $1,500 to $1,650 from 1986 to 1990. Section 6334(a)(3),
books and tools of the trade exemption, rose from $1,000 to $1,150 over the same
period.
92. In re Fink, 93 Neb. Bkr. 93:7, 10. See Karl D. Vogt, Note, Federal Tax Offsets of
Defaulted Student Loans-How Long is Too Long? Thomas v. Bennett, 22
CREiGHTON L. REV. 1141 (1988-1989).
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dicial liens, not statutory claims. Similarly, if the United States fore-
closes a mortgage in federal district court, the defendant does not have
recourse to section 25-1506 homestead stays, which would delay the
sale three months to nine months under Nebraska law, depending on
the vintage of the mortgage.
III. SPECIFIC EXEMPTIONS: SECTION 25-1556
Section 25-1556 of the Nebraska Revised Statutes provides in part
that:
[n]o property hereinafter mentioned shall be liable to attachment, execution
or sale on any final process issued from any court in this state, against any
person being a resident of this state: (1) The immediate personal possessions
of the debtor and his family; and (2) all necessary wearing apparel of the
debtor and his family; all kitchen utensils and household furniture, to be se-
lected by the debtor, not exceeding in value fifteen hundred dollars; all equip-
ment or tools used by the debtor or his family for their own support not
exceeding fifteen hundred dollars in value; the provisions for the debtor and
his family necessary for six months' support, either provided or growing, or
both; and fuel necessary for six months.9 3
In 1981, Duncan noted that section 25-1556, passed in 1969, was
"less than fifteen years old, and a substantial body of case law inter-
preting its provisions has not yet developed."94 Since then a consider-
able body of case law has been decided.
A. Personal Possessions, Motor Vehicles and Tools of the
Trade
Generally speaking, a debtor's most valuable possession, other
than the homestead, is an automobile. Federal exemption 522(d)(2)
provides each debtor with a $2,400 exemption for a motor vehicle.
Some states provide a specific exemption for motor vehicles., Other
states, like Iowa, provide shelter in a general category that specifically
includes an automobile. 95 Nebraska statutes do not provide a specific
motor vehicle exemption. Nebraskans either must fit the automobile
in as a $1,500 exemption under section 25-1556 as tool of the trade,
which is very difficult to accomplish, or under section 25-1552, the
$2,500 wild card exemption.
In In re Dahlberg,96 the court established that an automobile
would not pass under the classification "immediate personal posses-
sions of the debtor and family" under section 25-1556, reasoning that
the statutory language appeared to refer "to something more intimate
than a vehicle."97 However, a vehicle may be exempt as a "tool of the
93. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 25-1556 (Reissue 1989).
94. Duncan, supra note 2, at 267.
95. IowA CODE § 627.6.9 (1988).
96. Neb. Bkr. 79:75.
97. Id. at 76.
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trade" when the vehicle's use is "related to the occupation of the
debtor."98 For instance, an insurance salesman who put 81,000 miles
on an automobile while servicing farmers living in out-state Nebraska
was allowed to avoid a non-possessory, non-purchase money security
interest on the vehicle under section 522(d)(6).99 In In re Keller,100
the court found that even though the debtor's wife did not actively use
her husband's tools, the court allowed both spouses to claim a "tool of
the trade" $1,500 exemption, totaling $3,000. The court interpreted
the language so that the exemption facilitated the family's support.lOl
Section 522(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code refers to "personal prop-
erty." Sections 522(d)(3) and 522(f)(2)(A) refer to "household furnish-
ings" and "household goods." The Nebraska exemptions use different
language. Section 25-1556 includes "immediate personal possessions"
and "household furniture." Section 25-1552 applies to "personal prop-
erty." To date, the diversity in language has not caused insuperable
confusion, but Congress is struggling to define "household goods."o2
B. Provisions for Debtors
Farmers have attempted to stretch section 25-1556(2)'s "provisions
for debtors and their family necessary for six months' support" to in-
clude growing and harvested grain. In one case, the bankruptcy court
exempted $4,200 worth of a farmer's 1987 crop under the six months'
provisions allowance. The district court, however, reversed, stating
that this provision did not apply to growing crops which were not yet
provisions or food supplies and noting that the Legislature did not ex-
empt the proceeds of the harvested crop.103 Likewise, in another case,
where the assertion was made for approximately 2,400 bushels of corn
and 520 bushels of wheat, the lien avoidance was denied.1O4
IV. THE WILDCARD EXEMPTION: SECTION 25-1552
Nebraska Revised Statute section 25-1552 as amended in 1993
provides that:
98. In re Nachtigal, 82 B.R. 533, 535-36 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988).
99. In re Goosey, 10 B.R. 285 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981).
100. 50 B.R. 23 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985). See also In re Nachtigal, 82 B.R. 533 (Bankr.
D. Neb. 1988).
101. In re Keller, 50 B.R. 23 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985).
102. The section 522(d) definition of "household goods" includes clothing, furniture,
appliances, linens, china, crockery, and kitchenware and personal effects of the
debtor and debtor's dependents. Household goods do not include works of art,
electronic entertainment equipment except for one television and one radio, anti-
ques over 100 years old when the debtor acquired them, and jewelry other than
wedding rings. S. 540, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
103. First Nat'l Bank of Wahoo v. Plihal, 136 B.R. 810, 813 (D. Neb. 1989).
104. In re Dana, 136 B.R. 813 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990).
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[a]ll debtors who do not have lands, town lots, or houses subject to exemptions
as a homestead under sections 40-101 to 40-116 shall have exempt from
forced sale on execution the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars in personal
property, except wages. The provisions of this section shall not, in any man-
ner, apply to the exemption of wages, that subject being fully provided for by
section 25-1558. In proceedings involving a writ of execution, the exemption
from execution under this. section shall be claimed in the manner provided by
section 25-1516. The debtor desiring to claim an exemption from execution
under this section shall, at the time the request for hearing is filed, file a list of
the whole of the property owned by the debtor and an indication of the items of
property which he or she claims to be exempt from execution, along with a
value for each item listed. The debtor or his or her authorized agent may select
from the list an amount of property not exceeding the value exempt from execu-
tion under this section according to the debtor's valuation or the court's valua-
tion if the debtor's valuation is challenged by a creditor. 1 0 5
Little litigation has taken place under the wildcard exemption.
The nature of the wildcard suggests that anything may fit in, so long
as it does not exceed the $2,500 limitation. There is no distinction as
to necessities, luxury items, household goods, art, antiques, or the
like. In In re Welborne,106 the debtors sought to exempt a twenty-four
inch color television as "necessary" furniture under section 25-1556.
The creditor, ITT, argued that the stereo system and color television
were luxury items.10 7 The court's discussion regarding the "necessi-
ties of life" was inconclusive, but the property was found to be exempt
under the wildcard provision.1 0 8 In another case, the debtors ex-
empted a cash appearance bond under this section. However, the
court found that the garnishment lien was voidable as a judgment lien
pursuant to section 522(f)(1).109 Section 25-1552 is the main haven
for motor vehicles in Nebraska. For a married couple without a home-
stead, the exemption is doubled to $5,000.
V. DUE PROCESS AND GARNISHMENT PROCEDURE
In the face of a constitutional challenge, the Legislature amended
Nebraska's garnishment procedure in 1988 to provide the judgment
debtor notice, due process, and a right to hearing.110 Later in 1993,
the Legislature responded to another constitutional challenge to Ne-
braska's post-judgment execution process with Legislative Bill 463.111
In Schafer v. Long,1 12 Western Nebraska Legal Services brought a
105. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1552 (Cum. Supp. 1994) (emphasis added). Substantive
procedural change is in italics and does not come into play if the debtor files
bankruptcy.
106. 63 B.R. 23 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1986).
107. Id. at 25.
108. Id. at 26.
109. In re Avila, Neb. Bkr. 82:6. See In re Taylor, Neb. Bkr. 92:417.
110. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1011 (Reissue 1989).
111. L.B. 463, 93d Leg., 1st Sess. (1993).
112. Case No. 4:92CV3384 (D. Neb. Oct. 22, 1992).
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class action suit to challenge Nebraska procedure based on the Ohio
case, Hutchison v. Cox.113 The representative plaintiffs complained
that lack of notice and due process deprived them of their rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution and other federal stat-
utes. Legislative Bill 463, as originally introduced, would have radi-
cally curtailed the entire Nebraska exemption scheme. Only
'judgment debtors" would have been eligible to apply for the exemp-
tion.'1 4 A debtor without judgment would have had no right to
exemption. However, both the bill's sponsor and the committee dis-
claimed this intention, and the final version of this bill was merged
into Legislative Bill 458 with refined language." 5 Thus, while section
25-1552 has additional language, the Legislature did not intend to
change any substantive exemption. Judgment debtors are now given
notice of execution and have the burden of responding.116
VI. ANNUITY CONTRACT, INSURANCE PROCEEDS, AND
BENEFITS: SECTION 44-371
Section 44-371 dates from the depression. Judging from the legis-
lative history, section 44-371 operated in the absence of pension plans
and estate planning as a means by which farmers provided for their
retirement. In 1978, section 44-371 provided that:
[all money, avails, cash values, and all and every benefit accruing under any
annuity contract or under any policy or certificate of life insurance payable to
a beneficiary other than the estate of the insured, and under any accident or
health insurance policy, heretofore or hereafter issued, shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or other legal or equitable process, and from all
claims or creditors of the insured, and of the beneficiary if related to the in-
sured by blood or marriage, in the absence of a written agreement or assign-
ment to the contrary.1 17
The annuity exemption, section 44-371, has been hotly contested in
the bankruptcy courts, district courts, and circuit court of appeals.
When Nebraska opted out of the federal exemptions, section 44-371
113. 784 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D. Ohio 1992); See also Acean v. San Juan County Sheriff's
Dep't, 944 F.2d 691 (10th Cir. 1991)(holding New Mexico post-judgment execu-
tion statute unconstitutional).
114. See L.B. 634, 93d Leg., 1st Sess. (1993). The limitation of the exemption to "judg-
ment debtor" pervaded the entire exemption scheme, including homestead. In re
Plasden, 154 B.R. 305 (N.D. Cal. 1993), held that the California homestead ex-
emption could only be invoked by a debtor whose home was subject to forced sale
by a judgment creditor. The California Legislature quickly amended the home-
stead provision.
115. Public Hearing on L.B. 463, Before Committee on Judiciary of the Nebraska Uni-
cameral, 93d Leg., 1st Sess. 139, 142 (1993)(remarks of Sen. John Lindsay).
116. At this date, the interaction between an execution to which the judgment debtor
does not respond, the debtor filing bankruptcy, the section 362 automatic stay,
and the claim of exemption under state law inside bankruptcy is unknown.
117. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-371 (Reissue 1978)(emphasis added).
1994]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
was amended in 1980118 and again in 1981119 so that the exemption
would "not apply to any loan value in the excess of five thousand dol-
lars of an unmatured life insurance contract."120
At that time, no amendments had modified the status of the word
"all." Thus, in In re Lowe, 121 following a personal injury, the Union
Pacific Railroad agreed to pay the debtor $90,000 followed with
monthly payments of $500 for a period of twenty-five years with any
remainder upon the debtor's death to go to his estate under a release
and settlement agreement. The court found that a trust had not been
created and the payments were property of the estate.122 The trustee
argued that "the underlying agreement itself really constitutes a
structured settlement of a lawsuit."123 While not finding a valid
spendthrift trust, the court held that the character of the payment
met the dictionary definition of an "annuity" and therefore was ex-
empt.124 The Legislature was put on notice of the ambiguity of the
"structured settlement."
Later, the debtor Lowe argued that his assignment of the exempt
Union Pacific monthly payment to Alliance National Bank and Trust
Company was invalid because of the exemption. The court found that
the assignment was a statutorily valid transfer which removed the as-
set from its exempt status.125 The debtor's motion to avoid the lien
pursuant to section 522(h) was subsequently denied.126
In In re Block,127 debtors converted the $15,000 proceeds from a
teacher's annuity contract into savings certificates for the benefit of
the debtors' children and claimed that they were exempt. The bank-
ruptcy court overruled the trustee's objection to the exemption and the
trustee appealed to the district court to determine whether the sav-
ings certificates were part of the debtors' estate once they were found
to be exempt, or whether certificate of ownership had passed to the
debtors' children.' 28 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court
holding that under section 44-371 "annuities and proceeds therefrom
are exempt from property of the estate."'29 The court affirmed the
bankruptcy court's finding "that the savings certificates are traceable
to the annuity contracts. As such they are a form of cash proceeds
118. L.B. 940, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1980).
119. L.B. 327, 87th Leg., 1st Sess. (1981).
120. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-371 (Reissue 1984).
121. Neb. Bkr. 86:207.
122. Id. at 212.
123. Id. at 211.
124. Id. at 213.
125. In re Lowe, Neb. Bkr. 87:99, 105.
126. Id. at 261.
127. Neb. Bkr. 86:258.
128. Id. at 259.
129. Id. at 261.
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exempt under the statute."130 Block may mean that property is ex-
empt when acquired with proceeds derived from exempt property, a
reversal of the contentious problem of transforming non-exempt prop-
erty into exempt property.
The section 44-371 annuity exemption provisions were dramati-
cally amended due to protracted litigation in In re Armstrong.131
Armstrong filed Chapter 11 on December 31, 1986 and voluntarily
converted to Chapter 7 on May 1, 1987. Beginning in 1985 and
through the fall of 1986, the debtors sold non-exempt assets and trans-
ferred the $303,000 proceeds from the sales into annuities claimed to
be exempt under section 44-371. The Chapter 7 trustee and the Bank
of Hemingford, which was owed in excess of $800,000, objected to the
exemption. Relying on Eighth Circuit precedent, the court stated:
It is well established that under the Code, a debtor's conversion of non-exempt
property to exempt property on the eve of bankruptcy for the express purpose
of placing that property beyond the reach of creditors, without more, will not
deprive the debtor of the exemption to which he otherwise would be
entitled.132
Since the court found no "extrinsic evidence of fraud," the exemption
was allowed.133
The creditor pursued a second line of attack and began an adver-
sary proceeding to deny discharge based on 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).
That section states the court will grant a discharge unless "the debtor,
with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor ... has transferred
(A) property of the debtor within one year before the date of the filing
of the petition."'134 The court found "sufficient extrinsic evidence of
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor" and denied the dis-
charge.13 5 Thus, the bankruptcy court found the annuities exempt
but denied a discharge. The district court and the court of appeals
affirmed both decisions.136 Judge Crawford anticipated the seemingly
anomalous result when he observed:
[It] appears to be that even though the debtor is denied a discharge because he
committed a serious breach of duty prior to bankruptcy such as a fraudulent
conveyance with intent or the concealing of property, the exempt property
130. Id. at 262.
131. 93 B.R. 197 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988); 97 B.R. 565 (Bankr. D. Neb.), aff'd, 127 B.R.
852 (D. Neb. 1989), aff'd, 931 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1991).
132. 93 B.R. 197, 201-02 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988)(citing Hanson v. First National Bank
in Brookings, 848 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1988)).
133. Id. at 203.
134. In re Armstrong, 97 B.R. 565, 566-67 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989).
135. Id. at 569.
136. In re Armstrong, 97 B.R. 565 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989), aff'd 127 B.R. 852 (D. Neb.
1989). See also In re Lunday, 100 B.R. 502 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1989)(permitting ex-
emption and denying discharge).
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which is granted to him by Section 522 will never be liable for his pre-petition
debts.1 3 7
The Armstrong decision noted that the Nebraska Legislature was
facing debtor abuse of section 44-371.138 In 1981, the Legislature
through its Banking, Commerce and Insurance Committee not only
amended the annuity provision, but also provided a comprehensive
treatment of pension plans and structured settlements.139 Legislative
Bill 327 was meant "to control the very large and sophisticated and
well-to-do person who goes through bankruptcy who can utilize the
loophole that we have had in Nebraska up until this time.1 4o
While the text of section 44-371 was left intact, subparagraph (2)
was added to severely limit the use of annuities in bankruptcy and
against judgment debtors in civil court.
(2) This section shall not apply to an individual's aggregate interests greater
than ten thousand dollars on all loan values or cash values or all matured life
insurance contracts or to all proceeds, cash values, or benefits accruing under
all annuity contracts owned by such individual. Notwithstanding anything in
this subsection to the contrary, the aggregate exemptions any person may
claim under this subsection and subsection (3) of section 44-1089 shall not
exceed ten thousand dollars. 1 4 1
The most strategic pre-bankruptcy planning loophole had been closed.
Additionally, subparagraph (3) was added to protect insurance
companies.
In the debate, Senator Landis was the main proponent of the bill,
while Senator Schmit represented farmer's interests in preserving
section 44-371 as a retirement vehicle for farmers as originally con-
ceived in the 1930s. Senator Johnson advocated moderating the at-
tack on exemptions and modeling the amendment after the federal
exemption.1 42 Recognizing the futility of his position, Schmit stated:
"It's a tribute to the rural people they have survived as long as they
have."14 3 Senator Johnson, also frustrated, stated:
The reason that I am fighting this so hard, and will continue to fight this all
the way through passage, in that event that it is going to pass, is because
eight years ago this legislature nailed the debtors' skins to the doors when it
137. David L. Crawford, Exemptions and Redemption, Fundamentals of Bankruptcy
Practice Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Neb. Continuing Legal Edu-
cation (1979).
138. In re Armstrong, 93 B.R. 197, 202 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988).
139. Nebraska Legislative Bill 327 (1981) cured a "drafting error" in Nebraska Legis-
lative Bill 940 (1980). See L.B. 327, 87th Leg., 1st Sess. (1981).
140. See FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 327, 87TH LEG., 1ST SEss. 2474, 2476, 3500 (1981)(re-
marks of Sen. Landis).
141. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-371(2) (Reissue 1993). Section 44-1089 applied to fraternal
benefit policies. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-1089 (Reissue 1989).
142. See FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 335, 90TH LEG., 1ST SESS. 3684 (1987)(remarks of Sen.
V. Johnson).
143. See FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 335, 90TH LEG., isT SEss. 2578 (1987)(remarks of Sen.
Schmit).
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simply washed out all the federal bankruptcy exemptions and passed the Ne-
braska narrow exemptions. 144
The amendment to section 44-371 passed without the emergency
provisions that its proponents desired, becoming effective on August
30, 1987. No perceptible rush of filings occurred to take advantage of
the annuity loophole in the last six months of the unlimited annuity
exemption's existence. The amendment placed a cap of $10,000 on the
aggregate cash values of debtor owned annuity contracts and life in-
surance policy for exemption purposes. The amendment also con-
tained important provisions on pensions and structured settlements.
VII. FRATERNAL BENEFITS: SECTION 44-1089
The fraternal benefits exemption, like the annuity exemption dis-
cussed in the previous section, dates from the 1930s. The original ex-
emption in section 44-1029145 exempted all proceeds derived from an
organization defined as any "corporation, society, order or voluntary
association, without capital stock."146 These provisions exempted
groups that operated on a lodge system with rituals and representa-
tive government, commonly called fraternal societies.147 In 1985, Leg-
islative Bill 508 repealed sections 44-1001 to 44-1071, covering
fraternal insurance, and relocated coverage of fraternal insurance in
sections 44-1072 to 44-10,109.148 As passed in 1985, the exemption
limited the loan or cash value of unmatured life insurance to
$5,000.149 In 1987, Legislative Bill 335 raised the exempt loan or cash
value to $10,000.150
In closing, it should be noted that sections 44-371 and 44-1089 pro-
vide a total aggregate exemption of $10,000 per debtor, which is some-
what more generous than the analogous exemption provided by the
federal exemption in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(8), which has an $8,000 limi-
tation per debtor. Thus, sections 44-371 and 44-1089 could be used as
a means for sheltering assets where the equity in a home exceeded
$10,000. A married couple could mortgage their property to the extent
of $20,000, thus shielding $30,000 in equity. Whether this would pass
the good faith test and other barriers described above is problematic.
It does use the statutes as they are written, it does not cross state
lines, and its goal is to provide a modicum of future security for the
144. See FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 335,90TH LEG., lST SESS. 3687 (1987)(remarks of Sen.
V. Johnson).
145. NEB. REV. STAT. § 40-1029 (Reissue 1984).
146. Id. § 40-1001 (Reissue 1984).
147. Id. §§ 44-1001, 44-1002 (Reissue 1984).
148. L.B. 508, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (1985).
149. L.B. 508, 89th Leg., 1st Sess. (1985) (codified at NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-1089(2)
(Supp. 1985)).
150. L.B. 335, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (1987) (codified at NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-1089(3)
(Reissue 1988)).
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debtors, all of which suggest survival of the exemption in the face of a
challenge by a creditor or trustee.
VIII. STOCK, PENSIONS, AND SIMILAR PLANS:
SECTION 25-1563.01
Until 1987, Nebraska was one of the few states to offer only mini-
mal protection for retirement benefits.151 The passage of section 25-
1563.01, which tracks 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E), cured this omission.
In bankruptcy and in the collection of a money judgment, the following bene-
fits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or other legal or equitable
process and from all claims of creditors: To the extent reasonably necessary for
the support of the debtor and any dependent of the debtor, an interest held
under a stock bonus, pension, profit-sharing, or similar plan or contract paya-
ble on account of illness, disability, death, age, or length of services unless:
(1) Within two years prior to bankruptcy or to entry against the individual
of a money judgment which thereafter becomes final, such plan or contract
was established or was amended to increase contributions by or under the
auspices of the individual or of an insider that employed the individual at
the time the individual's rights under such plan or contract arose; or
(2) Such plan or contract does not qualify under section 401(a), 403(a),
403(b), or 408 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 or the successors of
such sections.1 52
The expression "to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of
the debtor and any dependent of the debtor" is identical to that found
in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E). This language raises two questions:
How much is "reasonably necessary," and does the exemption apply to
future and current income? Both questions are resolved on a case by
case analysis.
In In re Weaver,153 an ex-wife, who was a judgment creditor, chal-
lenged the exemption her healthy twenty-eight-year-old former hus-
band (who was earning $13.64 per hour) claimed in a retirement plan
containing $26,365. The court recognized "the objective of the legisla-
ture was to limit the previously existing unlimited exemption for an-
nuities and unmatured life insurance."154 Acknowledging "the
general purpose of placing a limitation upon the exemption for annui-
ties and unmatured life insurance,"'155 the court reviewed prior case
law and ultimately applied the eleven part test elucidated in In re Mc-
Cabe1 56 to determine reasonable necessity. The court concluded that
the entire retirement plan was exempt.
151. Certain city, county, and state employees had specific exemptions. The income
sources cited in section 522(d)(10)(A), (B), and (C) were exempt.
152. NEB. Ray. STAT. § 25-1563.01 (Reissue 1989)(emphasis added).
153. 98 B.R. 497 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988).
154. Id. at 498.
155. Id. at 499.
156. Id. at 500 (citing In re McCabe, 74 B.R. 119, 122 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1986)). The
eleven factors are (1) debtor's present and anticipated living expenses; (2)
debtor's present and anticipated income from all sources; (3) age of the debtor and
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In re Nuttleman 57 presented the court with two issues. The
debtor claimed his approximately $50,000 pension was exempt under
sections 25-1563.01 and 44-371 and also argued that the objecting
Chapter 7 trustee had not given notice of his objection within the re-
quired thirty days. The court found that the pension was property of
the estate and therefore, exempt pursuant to section 25-1563.01 and
its language "reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor."158
The court also ruled that the pension was exempt under section 44-
371 and concluded that "[since the Bankruptcy Code specifically al-
lows states to create exemptions, and since ERISA does not prohibit or
even speak of such exemptions, the only way to harmonize the two
federal statutes is to allow the exemption."' 159
Both parties appealed to the district court, where Judge Cam-
bridge's decision160 procedurally anticipated the Supreme Court rul-
ing in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz.161 Judge Cambridge found that,
pursuant to Code section 522(1) and Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 4003,
the trustee has thirty days to object to debtor claimed exemptions. On
the substantive issue, the district court found that the "ultimate deci-
sion of the bankruptcy court to overrule the trustee's objection to the
debtors' claim of exemption should be affirmed."162 The Weaver and
Nuttleman holdings do not provide much guidance in determining
whether benefits are "reasonably necessary for the support of the
debtor." They do, however, suggest that the court will grant substan-
tial latitude to the debtor and that a creditor or trustee has a difficult
burden to achieve a distribution from the pension plan.163
While section 25-1563.01 comports somewhat with the federal ex-
emption in 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(10)(E), Nebraska added a waiting, or
look back period which has no federal counterpart.164 The Legislature
debated whether to omit the waiting period or include a waiting period
of up to three years. In the end, the Legislature succeeded in closing a
loophole. While the Bankruptcy Code provides a one year look back
dependents; (4) health of the debtor and dependents; (5) debtor's ability to work
and earn a living; (6) debtor's job skills, training, and education; (7) debtor's other
assets, including exempt assets; (8) liquidity of other assets; (9) debtor's ability to
save for retirement; (10) special needs of the debtor and dependents; (11) debtor's
financial obligations, e.g. alimony or support payments." Id.
157. 117 B.R. 975 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990).
158. NEB. RE,. STAT. § 25-1563.01 (Reissue 1989).
159. In re Nuttleman, 117 B.R. 975, 979, 982 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990).
160. Nuttleman v. Myers, 128 B.R. 254 (D. Neb. 1991).
161. 112 S. Ct. 1644 (1992).
162. Nuttleman v. Myers, 128 B.R. 254, 256 (D. Neb. 1991).
163. But see In re Clark, 711 F.2d 21 (3rd Cir. 1983); In re Miller, 33 B.R. 549 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1983); In re Clark, 18 B.R. 824 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Kochell,
26 B.R. 86 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1982); In re Taf, 10 B.R. 101 (Bankr. D. Conn.
1981).
164. NEB. Rav. STAT. § 25-1563.01(1) (Reissue 1989).
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period for fraudulent conveyances in 11 U.S.C. § 548, Nebraska ex-
tends the period of scrutiny for identifying "loading up" or statutorily
suspect pre-bankruptcy conversion of assets.
In Patterson v. Shumate,165 the Supreme Court may have simpli-
fied the status of pensions, estate property, ERISA qualified plans,
and spendthrift provisions. In that case, Shumate was the president
of a furniture company that filed a Chapter 11 case which was later
converted into a Chapter 7 filing. Shumate himself filed a Chapter 11
case which was converted to Chapter 7. The decision involved the sta-
tus of Shumate's pension plan, valued at $250,000. Justice Blackmun
found that an ERISA qualified pension plan was not property of the
estate. Under section 541(c)(2), the court construed the plain meaning
of "applicable nonbankruptcy law" to include federal as well as state
law.166 ERISA benefits, therefore, fell within the meaning of the
exemption.
While pensions meeting the Shumate specifications are not deemed
property of the estate, Nebraska presents peculiar permutations of the
federal-state intersection. The Shumate decision does not create an
absolute safe harbor. A debtor filing bankruptcy could conceivably ex-
clude the pension from property of the estate, but if the debtor en-
gaged in "loading up" or inside transactions during the previous two
years, that portion of the retirement plan would not be exempt.167 In
bankruptcy, unlike Tveten or Johnson, the discharge would be granted
but the exemption disallowed. If the debtor is in Chapter 13, the court
may disallow a budget that continues voluntary debtor contribution to
a pension or 401 K profit sharing plan at the expense of disposable
income and, thus, at the expense of a larger distribution to unsecured
creditors.168
Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) are a product of federal, so-
cial, and economic planning. IRAs provide savings for security in re-
tirement, minimize income taxes for the year the money is earned and
saved, and defer the tax until retirement. Nebraska has no specific
exemption niche similar to 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1)(E), and, thus, for a
long time, hard-earned IRA savings destined for long term goals had
to be spent down or sheltered in exempt property lest the trustee
165. 112 S. Ct. 2242 (1992).
166. Id.
167. See Nancy E. Blackwell, To Include, Exclude, or Exempt-That is the Question!:
An Individual's Pension Benefits in Bankruptcy and the Potential Effect of H.R.
3804,60 U. Mo. K.C. L. Rsv. 291 (1991); David M. Landis & Jon E. Kane, ERISA
Exemptions in Bankruptcy: A Logical Solution, 66 AM. BAWN. L.J. 253, 278
(1992).
168. In re Cavanaugh, Neb. Bkr 93:449. As a policy matter, following Resnick's fifth
prong, should creditors share partial responsibility for funding reasonable retire-
ment contributions? See Resnick, supra note 37, at 621; In re Cedar, Neb. Bkr.
94-279.
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claim it upon filing bankruptcy. By liquidating the IRA in anticipa-
tion of bankruptcy, the debtor incurred tax liability. When the debtor
claimed his IRA as exempt, the trustee argued that a debtor's IRA did
"not fall within the parameters of a 'similar plan or contract payable
on account of illness, disability, death, age or length of service.' "169 In
a case of first impression, the bankruptcy court found that the "unique
wording" of section 25-1563.01 and "[t]he language used by the legis-
lature in the statute strongly indicates an intent by the Legislature to
generally include plans or contracts such as IRA's within the statutory
exemption.17o
IX. LUMP-SUM AND
STRUCTURED SETTLEMENTS: SECTION 25-1563.02
Section 44-371 previously provided shelter for structured annuity-
like settlements in which debtors could receive a stream of income in
compensation for loss of earning capacity.' 7 ' When the Unicameral
pared down section 44-371 for annuities, a specific exemption was also
needed for structured settlements.
However, in 1987, the Legislature passed section 25-1563.02 which
made structured settlements exempt.i7 2 In In re Hitch,173 a debtor
had received a $465,000 personal injury settlement. The trustee
claimed the entire amount and assignee bank claimed $22,549.56.
The debtor argued that the bulk of the award arose post-petition, that
the settlement was not property of the estate, and that the settlement
was exempt under the provisions of section 48-149. The court found
that the entire settlement amount was property of the estate ex-
empted pursuant to section 25-1563.02 and, therefore, subject to as-
signment to the bank. The court noted that the structured settlement
exemption anticipated assignment and provided funds that were ex-
empt "unless a written assignment to the contrary had been ob-
tained."174 Additionally, a settlement that provided for an initial
payment of $18,000 and then $2,300.81 per month for the following
twelve months was completely exempt.' 7 5 As in Weaver and Nut-
tleman, the court liberally construed the statute.
Section 25-1563.02 was liberally amended in 1993 by Legislative
Bill 118, which provides that "[a]ll proceeds and benefits, including
169. In re Anzalone, 122 B.R. 730, 731 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990). See also In re Brehm,
Neb. Bkr. 93:454.
170. In re Anzalone, 122 B.R. 730, 731 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990). See also In re Brehm,
Neb. Bkr. 93:454 (citing legislative intent to include IRAs as exempt property).
171. See In re Lowe, Neb. Bkr. 86:207, 208.
172. NEB. REV. STAT. 25-1563.02 (Reissue 1989).
173. Neb. Bkr. 89:451.
174. Id. at 459.
175. In re Tate, Neb. Bkr. 92:393.
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interest earned thereon, which are paid in either a lump sum or are
accruing under any structured settlement.., shall be exempt."'176
X. NEBRASKA'S HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION: SECTION 40-101
Nebraska's homestead statute dates back to territorial days. Ac-
cording to Professor Henry H. Foster, the primary purpose was to ben-
efit the state by preservation of the family, as the exemption is
provided to rich and poor alike.17 7 However, a monetary limit was
imposed on the exemption to prevent the rich from using it to avoid
paying debts which they could well afford to pay without hardship on
their families.178 Professor Duncan's analysis brought the statute and
case law into the early 1980s.179
Homestead exemptions vary from state to state. The federal ex-
emption of $7,500 per debtor established in 1978 was revised to
$15,000 in 1994.180 The most generous states are Florida, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Minnesota, Texas, and Washington. All allow a 100% exemption.
However, Iowa law provides that homestead equity is not exempt
against claims for indebtedness which pre-date the homestead acqui-
sition if a deficiency remains on the prior debts after exhausting other
property.' 81 Fifteen states permit homestead exemptions between
$16,000 and $100,000. Seven states provide exemptions between
$7,600 and $15,000, including Nebraska, which exempts homesteads
at $10,000. Seventeen states have homestead exemptions of $7,500 or
less, but in some instances both parties in a marriage may claim sepa-
rate exemptions, thus doubling the exemption's value.
While homestead protection endures as one of the most fundamen-
tal and motivating concerns of debtor homeowners, Nebraska's home-
stead exemption policy stubbornly resists all but grudging and
incremental changes. The homestead exemption remains woefully in-
adequate. The story of Nebraska's homestead exemption in the last
dozen years is mostly one of what did not happen.' 8 2 It is a story of
the struggle not to lose liberal interpretations of the past 83 and a
176. L.B. 118, 93d Leg., 1st Sess. (codified at NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1563.02 (Cum.
Supp. 1994) (emphasis added)).
177. The Nebraska Homestead, 3 NEB. L. BuLL. No. 2, 112 (1924).
178. Id. at 357.
179. See Duncan, supra note 2.
180. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 5116, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. Sec. 108(d) (en-
acted Oct. 22, 1994).
181. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 561.16, 561.21 (1992).
182. Nebraska Legislative Bill 999 attempted to provide a significant increase, but
failed, when radical compromise became necessary to save the bill. The bill as
passed did provide some relief to farmers by altering the foreclosure process. L.B.
999, 89th Leg., 2d Sess. (1986).
183. See infra note 218 discussing an unpublished bankruptcy decision denying the
homestead exemption to a widow.
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story of lost opportunities to make significant progress.' 8 4 Homestead
exemption issues in this state continue to be crucial for debtors, credi-
tors, and practicing attorneys.
A. Case Law Developments
Nebraska's homestead exemption laws are codified in sections 40-
101 through 40-118. This Article's analysis of Nebraska's homestead
exemption policy, execution, forced sale, and bankruptcy, treats the
sections in par! materia. Section 40-101 defines the exemption as "[a]
homestead not exceeding ten thousand dollars in value shall consist of
the dwelling house in which the claimant resides, its appurtenances
and the land on which the same is situated... ."1 8 5 The section limits
the exemption to 160 acres of land to be selected by an owner who
resides outside the limits of an incorporated city or village and to "a
quantity of contiguous land not exceeding two lots" if the homestead is
within any incorporated city or village.186
The current version of section 40-102 reads as follows:
If the claimant be married, the homestead may be selected from the separate
property of the husband, or with the consent of the wife from her separate
property. When the claimant is not married, but is the head of a family within
the meaning of section 40-115, the homestead may be selected from any of his
or her property. 187
Section 40-102's awkwardness apparently results from the Unicam-
eral's erratic efforts to eliminate sexist or gender-biased language
from its statutes. 8 8 This language appears to say that a married
couple qualifies for the homestead exemption, but that only one of the
184. Nebraska Legislative Bill 999 (1986) and Nebraska Legislative Bill 463 (1993)
were opportunities to scrutinize and liberalize the homestead exemption laws.
The final versions of those bills fell short of true reform. See L.B. 999, 89th Leg.,
2d Sess. (1986); L.B. 463, 93d Leg., 1st Sess. (1993).
185. NE . REv. STAT. § 40-101 (Reissue 1993).
186. Id. This difference between rural and urban homesteads is quite customary, oc-
curring in most jurisdictions that have opted out of the federal exemption
scheme. The federal exemptions did not provide this distinction.
187. NEB. REv. STAT. § 40-102 (Reissue 1993). This language also raises, but fails to
answer, the question as to why a wife can apparently claim a homestead exemp-
tion in the separate property of her husband without his consent, and yet a hus-
band cannot make such a claim from his wife's separate property in the absence
of her statutorily mandated consent. Additionally, the husband cannot file an
individual bankruptcy to claim the section 25-1552 exemption and also claim the
homestead exemption, in his bankruptcy, attributing it to the non-filing wife's
separate property, unless the homestead truly is the wife's separate property.
See In re Callahan, Neb. Bkr. 94:49.
188. For a more detailed explanation of the impact on the section of the Legislature's
intent and efforts to remove "sexist language" from the Nebraska statutes, see
Duncan, supra note 2, at 237, n.85.
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two spouses can claim it;189 and a non-married person can qualify for
the homestead exemption if, but only if, the individual is head of fam-
ily, as defined in section 40-115.
Section 40-103 states:
The homestead is subject to execution or forced sale in satisfaction of judg-
ments obtained (1) on debts secured by mechanics', laborers', or vendors' liens
upon the premises; and (2) on debts secured by mortgages upon the premises
executed and acknowledged by both husband and wife, or an unmarried
claimant.19 0
This section provides certain instances when the homestead exemp-
tion is inoperative. Essentially, consensual liens, held by certain enu-
merated lienholders, that follow the proper formalities of execution
and acknowledgement procedures, are removed from the prohibitions
of the exemption. Thus, creditors secured by mortgages and mechan-
ics liens are generally entitled, upon default by the debtors, to execu-
tion and forced sale unhampered by the homestead exemption.
In Federal Land Bank of Omaha v. Blankemeyer,191 the debtors
asserted that a foreclosure decree created a judicial lien avoidable
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). Referring to section 40-103, the Ne-
braska Supreme Court held that a judicial foreclosure decree does not
convert a section 40-103 consensual lien into a 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1)
avoidable judicial lien.' 9 2 Therefore, the mortgagee, Federal Land
Bank of Omaha, held an unavoidable lien, upon which it was free to
foreclose, since the homestead exemption was inoperative.
This case also upheld the constitutionality of section 40-103.
Among other theories, the debtors alleged that section 40-103 gives
consensual lienholders a special privilege or immunity which violated
the Nebraska Constitution.' 93 The debtors also argued that section
40-103 rendered these specially classified lienholders immune from
the operation of homestead exemption law. The court determined that
section 40-103 does not immunize the lienholder from 11 U.S.C. § 522;
rather, the federal law just does not apply. Section 40-104 protects
competent but ignorant or unwitting spouses by describing the formal-
ities that creditors must follow in order for their section 40-103 con-
sensual mortgage liens to take priority over the homestead exemption.
189. Accordingly, one former spouse cannot invoke their homestead exemption in the
marital home, against claims of the other former spouse by virtue of the terms of
a divorce decree. See In re Holtzhauser, 117 B.R. 519 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990).
190. NEB. REv. STAT. § 40-103 (Reissue 1993).
191. 228 Neb. 249, 422 N.W.2d. 81 (1988).
192. Id. at 251, 422 N.W.2d at 83.
193. NEB. CONsT. art. III, § 18. In relevant part, this section provides: 'The Legisla-
ture shall not pass local or special laws... Granting to any corporation, associa-
tion, or individual any special or exclusive privileges, immunity, or franchise
whatever..." Id.
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These formalities must be complied with whenever spouses jointly
own the subject homestead.
In Landon v. Pettijohn,194 a prospective purchaser sued reneging
sellers of real estate for specific performance. The sellers were a hus-
band and wife who qualified for homestead exemption status under
section 40-102. The sellers had failed to comply with the section 40-
104 acknowledgement formalities imposed on married homeowners.
The sellers argued that since their signatures were not notarized on
the purchase agreement, that agreement was invalid. The court
agreed, ruling that the sellers did not have to sell their land. The
plaintiff argued that section 40-103 violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution195 because the statute classi-
fied married and non-married property owners differently and re-
quired only married property owners to notarize documents
transferring real estate. The court upheld section 40-103, concluding
that the classification was reasonably related to the legislative policy
of preserving the family.196
Section 40-105 provides that the "head of family"'197 must apply for
or assert the homestead exemption when faced with forced sale or exe-
cution by a creditor outside of those consensual lienholders set forth in
section 40-103. This provision gives rise to the obvious dilemma of
accurately identifying the "head of family."'98
In In re Hartman,199 husband and wife debtors brought an adver-
sary proceeding seeking a determination that each spouse was enti-
tled to claim a homestead exemption. The debtors argued that 11
U.S.C. § 522(m) mandated that each debtor be allowed to separately
claim his or her exemptions in a joint case. They contended that Ne-
braska could not opt-out of section 522(m), but could only opt-out of
the section 522(d) exemption scheme.20 0 The bankruptcy court ruled
that Nebraska's opting-out rendered different sub-sections of 522 ap-
plicable to debtors' options and that as a result, state law provided the
194. 231 Neb. 837, 438 N.W.2d. 757 (1989).
195. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
196. Landon v. Pettijohn, 231 Neb. 837, 843, 438 N.W.2d 757, 761 (1989). See also In
re Kouth, Neb. Bkr. 93:234 (relying on NEB. REv. STAT. § 40-104).
197. NEB. REv. STAT. § 40-115 (Reissue 1993)(defining "head of family").
198. See infra notes 210-211 and accompanying text for further discussion of section
40-115.
199. 19 B.R. 844 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982).
200. Id. at 845. See also Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60 (4th Cir. 1981)(inter-
preting 11 U.S.C. § 522(m) to allow each debtor in a joint case to claim exemp-
tions). See generally 3 COLLmR ON BiKm § 522.05(5), at 522-27 (Lawrence P.
King, et. al, eds., 15th ed. 1994)(discussing application of § 501 to joint cases).
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only exemptions available to debtors.201 Accordingly, only one home-
stead exemption was permitted. 20 2
Sections 40-106, 40-107 and 40-108 provide the procedures for
claiming the homestead exemption. The "head of family" has the bur-
den of compliance. The court ultimately determines whether or not
compliance occurred. The court determines whether or not the claim-
ant is entitled to the exemption and determines the value and extent
of the homestead. The "head of family" can assert his or her exemp-
tion until an already completed sale has been confirmed.203 Section
40-108(2) raises one troubling aspect of this procedure:
In the event the land which is determined by the court to be subject to the
homestead exemption has already been sold on execution by the sheriff, the
sale shall be set aside and the judgment creditor shall be assessed the costs of
the sale and of the hearing, unless such land was sold for more than the home-
stead exemption.2 04
Another "trap door" is created by this provision.2 0 5 The floor of safety
allegedly provided to married or qualifying head of family homeown-
ers making timely claims for the homestead exemption, prior to confir-
mation of sale, is precisely that homesteads will not be forcibly sold
upon execution by creditors. The debtor may fall through the trap
door since the homestead can in fact be sold and confirmed, despite
the proper and timely assertion of a homestead exemption, if the prop-
erty was sold for a sufficient price in the court's opinion. Granted, this
occurrence would not place the former homeowner in further debt, but
the house will have been lost.206 Cash is not a satisfying substitute
201. In re Hartman, 19 B.R. 844, 845 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1982).
202. Id. However, the debtor spouse prohibited from taking advantage of a second
homestead exemption was permitted to take an in-lieu-of-homestead exemption
as provided by NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1552 (Reissue 1989), in addition to the home-
stead exemption that was allowed to her spouse. For a discussion in the text
pertaining to one spouse exerting the homestead exemption and the other spouse
claiming the in-lieu-of-homestead exemption, see supra note 31 and accompany-
ing text.
203. See NEB. REv. STAT. § 40-105 (Reissue 1993).
204. NEB. REv. STAT. § 40-108(2)(Reissue 1993)(emphasis added).
205. The phrase "trap door" alludes to the metaphor in Professor Duncan's article. See
Duncan, supra note 2.
206. Imagine the following hypothetical scenario: The hometown billionaire is in Eu-
rope on an extended business trip/vacation. Her homestead is paid for, free and
clear of liens and encumbrances, and is valued at one million dollars. She is a
head of family. Meanwhile, the local crank sues Ms. Billionaire for $1,000 over
some injury, real or imagined, and gets service upon the person of a household
staff member, who either forgets, declines, or cannot get in touch with his boss. A
crotchety county judge enters a default judgment for $1,000, and the crafty crank
registers the judgment in the district court. Time passes, and the crafty, cranky,
creditor obtains execution upon the homestead and it is sold for $701,000. Prior
to confirmation of the sale, the billionaire returns to town and is horrified to learn
of developments. Her lawyers rush down and properly and timely assert a home-
stead exemption. The court determines that the sale will not be set aside because
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for one's home.207 Real estate is unique, leading Nebraska law to rec-
ognize specific performance awards to frustrated plaintiff purchasers.
Cash may not be much comfort to a displaced homeowner.
Sections 40-110 through 40-113 set forth procedures for dividing
lands, separating homesteads from larger parcels of land, completing
bids and sales, and distributing the proceeds of sales.208 These provi-
sions would primarily apply to rural homesteads in excess of 160
acres. Owners of these homesteads who need to claim the exemption
because they are facing foreclosure, forced sale, or the filing of a bank-
ruptcy, should review the procedures contained in these sections care-
fully. Passage of Legislative Bill 999 in 1986 made changes allowing
for the marshaling of assets to preserve the homestead.2 09
Section 40-115 is the statutory litany of co-resident relatives that
render a homeowner "head of family," thus qualifying for the home-
stead exemption. Unchanged since the 1979 revision, this mysterious
"head of family" definition reads:
The phrase head of a family, as used in sections 40-101 to 40-116, includes
within its meanings every person who has residing on the premises with him
or her, and under his or her care or maintenance: (1) His or her minor child, or
the minor child of his or her deceased wife or husband, (2) a minor brother or
sister, or the minor child of a deceased brother or sister, (3) a father, mother,
grandfather or grandmother, (4) the father or mother, grandfather or grand-
mother of a deceased husband or wife, or (5) an unmarried sister, brother or
any other of the relatives mentioned in this section who have attained the age
of majority and are unable to take care of themselves. 2 1 0
This language is somewhat strange and confusing, especially in light
of case law which indicates that once a homestead, always a home-
stead, unless and until it has been voluntarily terminated. 2 11 Ne-
braska homestead exemption law clearly allows any owner 2 12 actually
the sale price was sufficient. The creditor received satisfaction of his $1,000 judg-
ment, the property sold for 70% of its value, and accordingly, $700,000 was paid
over to the former homeowner. This would appear to be lawful under Nebraska
homestead exemption laws. See also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 114 S. Ct.
1757 (1994)(interpreting "reasonably equivalent value" under 11 U.S.C.
§ 548(a)(2) as the price in fact received at a foreclosure sale).
207. See e.g., Nuttelman v. Julch, 228 Neb. 750, 424 N.W.2d. 333 (1988).
208. Sections 40-109 and 40-114 have been repealed.
209. See infra notes 250-257 and accompanying text; FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 999, 89TH
LEG., 2D SESS. 10158-60 (1986)(remarks of Sen. R. Johnson).
210. NEB. REv. STAT. § 40-115 (Reissue 1993).
211. See e.g., In re Bartlett, Neb. Bkr 93:1. See McIntosh v. Borchers, 196 Neb. 109,
241 N.W.2d. 534 (1976); Struempler v. Peterson, 190 Neb. 133, 206 N.W.2d. 629
(1973); Federal Credit Co. v. Reynolds, 132 Neb. 495, 272 N.W. 397 (1937);
Dougherty v. White, 112 Neb. 675, 200 N.W. 884 (1924); Palmer v. Sawyer, 74
Neb. 108, 103 N.W. 1088 (1905); Dorrington v. Meyers, 11 Neb. 388, 9 N.W. 555
(1881).
212. One exception to the ownership requirement is set forth in NEB. ray. STAT. § 40-
102 (Reissue 1993). Pursuant to this section, one possible scenario exists
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occupying the land2 1s who is either married or an unmarried head of
family to assert a homestead exemption. A plain language reading
demonstrates that a never-married, single person living alone would
not be entitled to claim a homestead exemption under any conceivable
scenario.2 14 At first blush, it would seem that a person who was once
married or was once the head of a family before some change of cir-
cumstances such as divorce or death would, in many instances, lose
his or her basis for claiming a homestead exemption.
Nebraska cases have ameliorated that harsh result.215 In 1905,
the Nebraska Supreme Court held that a widower who no longer qual-
ified as the head of family should not be involuntarily divested of his
homestead exemption. 21 6 This policy was recently reiterated and co-
gently articulated in In re Bartlett.2 17 The court reviewed and dis-
cussed Nebraska case law pertaining to the homestead exemption
issue and concluded that "once acquired, a homestead interest contin-
ues until voluntarily sold or abandoned."2 18 Accordingly, any person
whereby a married person could claim the homestead from the separate property
of a consenting spouse.
213. The occupancy requirement was reiterated and clarified in Travelers Indemnity
Co. v. Heim, 218 Neb. 326, 352 N.W.2d. 921 (Neb. 1984). Heim's house was lo-
cated on mortgaged premises and faced foreclosure, but Heim's family occupied a
trailer in Colorado and had removed windows and doors on the premises, leaving
a shell of a house with a telephone and mailbox. See also United States v.
Thomassen, 610 F. Supp. 386, 400 & n.6 (D. Neb. 1985)(holding that 1,120 acres
of irrigated pasture and timberland was subject to an actual "undivided owner-
ship interest in the property," but was not a homestead under Nebraska law be-
cause no one was living on the land at the time).
214. It is not unusual for an elderly single person, or widow or divorcee, swamped by
medical creditors, occupying a house acquired after being widowed, with a value
of $10,000, free and clear, to be forced into a Chapter 13 because the debtor is not
entitled to a homestead. The Chapter 7 trustees, while loathe to take away
homes from senior citizens, are also constrained by the language "head of the
household."
215. Galligher v. Smiley, 28 Neb. 189, 44 N.W. 184 (1889). In Galligher, a debtor
owned a parcel of land that had been annexed into the city limits. The homestead
exemption available in the city was smaller in size than homesteads outside of
the city. The size of the debtor's homestead was within the permissible exemp-
tion size outside of town, but larger than the permissible exemption inside town.
Upon annexation, a creditor attempted to execute on her judgment and force a
sale. The court protected the homestead, believing that once homestead rights
attached, those same rights remained intact until voluntarily sold or abandoned.
The intervening annexation was not a voluntary act by the debtor.
216. Palmer v. Sawyer, 74 Neb. 108, 103 N.W. 1088 (1905).
217. Neb. Bkr. 93:1.
218. Id. at 3. This reversed an unpublished decision of a few months earlier. In In re
Henry, No. 91-41972 (Bankr. D. Neb. Jan. 15, 1992), the court granted the Chap-
ter 13 trustee's objection, and determined that a widow who was no longer the
head of a family at the time of applying for the exemption was not entitled to
claim it under the terms of Nebraska law, due in part apparently to the 1974
legislative repeal of NEi. REv. STAT. § 40-117 (Reissue 1971). The Chapter 13
trustee's major argument in brief was that the 1905 Palmer v. Sawyer decision,
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entitled to a homestead exemption by virtue of being either married or
the head of family would retain his or her homestead rights even if
that person subsequently is no longer married or the head of the
family.
That being the case, the clause in section 40-115(5) that provides
*. or any other of the relatives in this section who have attained the
age of majority and are unable to take care of themselves" allows a
narrow list of certain, specified, less-than-fully-competent relatives,
whether or not they have resided with the claimant in the past (ren-
dering to the claimant head of family status as long as the claimant
continued to occupy the premises), to move in with the claimant for
the purpose of creating the exemption that may save the homestead
from execution and forced sale by creditors. The statute on its face
permits this tactic, so long as there is an actual and necessary depen-
dency by reason of the dependent's inability to support himself or
herself.219
"Home ownership has long been regarded as a mark of social, eco-
nomic, and political stability."220 It "continues to be a telling indicator
of status and responsibility."22 1 "In much of America, becoming a
homeowner takes on a social significance that is second only to taking
a job."222 Approximately fifty-two percent of bankruptcy petitioners
are homeowners. 223
Since home ownership is vital to American culture, in an era of
increased bankruptcy filings, many consumer bankruptcies are filed
primarily to save or protect the debtors' homes.
The picture of homeowners in bankruptcy is one of people struggling to keep
their homes. Whether fighting their mortgage lenders or concealing the fact
of their bankruptcy while they scramble to meet their mortgage payments, the
debtors in bankruptcy have not given up. The data reinforce the notion that
debtors do whatever they can to save their homes.2 2
4
A motivated homeowner in Nebraska who would not otherwise qualify
for a homestead exemption, who had significant home equity but who
needed to file a bankruptcy, would have several pre-bankruptcy op-
tions225 available to qualify for the exemption in order to protect the
holding that a homestead once acquired was not involuntarily lost thereafter,
was at least partially based on section 40-117 or its predecessor. The trustee
argued that the 1974 repeal of section 40-117 rendered this holding moot, or at
least questionable.
219. Hyde v. Hyde, 60 Neb. 502, 83 N.W. 673 (1900).
220. SmUvAN, supra note 14, at 128.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 129.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 143.
225. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text regarding the issues and risks in-
herent in converting non-exempt property into exempt property prior to filing a
bankruptcy.
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homestead. For example, it is possible that a claimant could marry to
qualify under section 40-102. Like deportable immigrants who marry
for the protective status of derivative citizenship, foreclosable home-
owners can marry for the protection of the homestead exemption.2 2 6
Traditionally, the homestead meant the nuclear family, husband
and wife. Changing mores, equal rights, and gender neutral legisla-
tion constitute a trend toward legally recognizing that one person, re-
gardless of gender, can constitute a household, and therefore, a single
person can claim the homestead exemption. Nebraska has not recog-
nized these developments. Without detailing the forty-nine other
states, Resnick stated in 1978 that "[m]any exemptions apply only
when the debtor is the head of a household."22 7 His examples were
Colorado, Mississippi, and Washington.2 28 By 1993, however, Colo-
rado no longer referred to a "head of household"229 and provided a
$30,000 homestead exemption to property "occupied as a home by the
owner thereof or his family .. "230 Mississippi had provided that
"[e]very citizen of this state, male or female, being a householder shall
be entitled" to a $75,000 homestead exemption. 23 ' Single households
were eligible for the homestead exemption.23 2 Washington continues
to maintain a homestead exemption tied to being the head of family.
Finally, although not cited by Resnick, Nebraska's sister state, Iowa,
provides a total homestead exemption to the home owner.23 3
Under Nebraska's section 40-103, the prospective claimant can ac-
quire a larger or additional mortgage or mechanic lien indebtedness
increasing the indebtedness against the homestead, lowering the eq-
uity below the threshold amount.23 4 Similarly, under section 40-115,
the debtor could locate a qualifying relative and move them into the
homestead. Pursuant to that section, a debtor could forego marriage,
acquire a minor child, and then assert a valid claim for the exemption.
226. It always seems to cheapen justice to resort to creative stratagems to achieve
equity and compassion within the confines of vague, stingy, and archaic stat-
utes-born of desperation on the part of debtors whom these statutes were
designed to protect, and intellectual discomfort by those charged with the obliga-
tion of achieving justice.
227. Resnick, supra note 37 at 625, n.64.
228. Id.
229. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 13-54-102 (1991).
230. Id. § 38-54-102.
231. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-23 (1991).
232. Id. § 85-3-21; Pickle v. Pickle, 476 So. 2d 32 (Miss. 1985).
233. IowA CODE § 561.1 (1993).
234. If the additional indebtedness is in the nature of a mortgage, the proceeds must
be made exempt, such as by placing them in an exempt annuity pursuant to NEB.
REv. STAT. § 44-371 (Reissue 1993).
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Does a fetus give rise to a valid claim for homestead exemption?235
Because it is a matter of policy and tradition in bankruptcy that ex-
emptions are to be liberally construed in favor of debtors, both nation-
ally236 and in Nebraska,37 and, further, because the Nebraska
Legislature decided to replace the federal bankruptcy exemption
schedule with a less generous state exemption scheme, 238 this sort of
desperate posturing by debtors is not only necessary, but encouraged.
More generous exemptions would obviate the need for such desperate
tactics.
In re Wagner2 39 provides an instructive illustration. The debtors
filed their joint bankruptcy petition subsequent to the congressional
enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code but prior to Nebraska's 1980
opting out of the federal exemptions. The debtors were jointly able to
claim a $15,000 aggregate homestead exemption, which enabled them
to save their house. If Nebraska's exemption laws had been in effect,
the debtors would have been able to exempt only $4,000.
When Nebraska opted out 2 4o of the more generous federal exemp-
tion scheme while simultaneously increasing the homestead exemp-
tion from $4,000 to $6,500241 and the in-lieu-of-homestead exemption
from $1,500 to $2,500,242 Professor Duncan called the compromise "a
235. Instead of getting married, perhaps all a single female homeowner would have to
do is to become pregnant. If so, and she were then unable to stave off creditors for
nine months, what would be her homestead status on the date of filing? By the
time the issue came before a court, the birth would in all likelihood have oc-
curred. It is conceivable that a court would deny the exemption and cause the
forced sale of the mother's and infant's homestead.
236. In re Ageton, 14 B.R. 833, 836 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981).
237. First Natl Bank v. McClanahan, 83 Neb. 706, 711, 120 N.W. 185, 187 (1909). See
e.g., Dougherty v. White, 112 Neb. 675, 200 N.W. 884 (1924); Palmer v. Sawyer,
74 Neb. 108, 103 N.W. 1088 (1905).
238. Duncan, supra note 2, at 234.
239. Neb. Bkr. 81:57.
240. Opt-out states have generally followed one of three models. Nebraska's approach
is consistent with the majority of the opt-out jurisdictions. State law declares
that the exemptions of the Bankruptcy Code are not authorized and impose state
requirements and amounts with which the debtors must comply. Other ap-
proaches include opting out of the federal bankruptcy exemption schedules and
then establishing a state scheme that is applicable only in bankruptcy situations,
different from non-bankruptcy context state exemptions. The third approach
arises from the community property approach and is exemplified in California,
where debtors can elect between federal and state exemptions, but joint debtors
must agree. See Lee Robert Bogdanoff, Exemptions Under the Bankruptcy Code:
Using California's New Homestead Law as a Medium for Analysis, 72 CAIuF. L.
Ray. 922, 926 (1984). See generally Joseph Lamport, The Preemption of Bank-
ruptcy-Only Exemptions, 6 CARnozo L. REv. 583 (1985).
241. L.B. 940, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1980)(codified at NEB. Rav. STAT. § 40-101 (Reissue
1993)).
242. L.B. 940, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. (1980)(codified at NEB. Rsv. STAT. § 25-1552 (Reis-
sue 1989)).
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reasonable balance between debtor and creditor interests."243 Since
then, Nebraska has increased the exemption to $10,000244 while the
federal exemption has increased to $30,000.245 Assuming for the sake
of argument that $6,500 was a reasonable balance in 1980, a quick
comparison of not only the federal exemptions, but also various area
states, demonstrates that $10,000 is austere and oppressive in
1994.246 In light of current housing valuations, this amount should be
increased, at least prospectively. There might be both federal2 4 7 and
state248 constitutional difficulties in attempting to apply increases
retroactively.2 49
243. Duncan, supra note 2, at 234.
244. FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 999, 89th Leg., 2d Sess. 10160 (1986)(Sen. Hoagland
describing compromise amendments). This bill, as originally introduced by Sen.
Rod Johnson, proposed increasing the homestead exemption to $40,000. This
amount was lowered during amendments by the Judiciary Committee to $20,000.
Further compromise watered down the final version to $10,000. See JUDicIRY
Comm. HEARING ON L.B. 999, 89TH LEG., 2D SEss. 2 (1986)(remarks of
Chairperson).
245. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 5116, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. Sec. 108(d)-(e)
(enacted Oct. 24, 1994) (amending § 522(d)).
246. Federal exemptions provide for $15,000 per debtor ($30,000 for joint filing by hus-
band and wife), with some opportunity to apply residual exemptions to other as-
sets if the homestead if not otherwise exhausted. Id. Iowa allows for unlimited
homestead exemption when applied to post homestead purchase indebtedness.
IOWA CODE §§ 561.16, 561.21 (1993). North Dakota provides for a homestead ex-
emption of $80,000. N.D. CoNST. art. XI, § 22; N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01
(Supp. 1989). Colorado's homestead exemption is $30,000. COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 38-41-201 (1993 Cum. Supp.). Texas, the first American state to provide a
homestead exemption, allows an unlimited homestead exemption as to dollar
amount (but with a restriction on size). TEx. COwsT. art. 16, § 50; Tax. STAT. ANN.
§ 41.000 (1985). Kansas provides for an unlimited homestead exemption in terms
of dollar amounts, limiting the size only to 160 acres of farm land and one acre in
town. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.2301 (1983). South Dakota likewise provides for an
unlimited dollar amount, restricting size to one acre in town and 160 acres when
not in town. S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 43-31-4 (1983). Wyoming joins Ne-
braska with a $10,000 exemption, but each spouse may claim $10,000. Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 1-20-101, 1-20-102(b) (1977). Only Missouri, at $8,000, has a
smaller exemption than Nebraska. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513-475 (Vernon Supp.
1993). With the exception of Missouri, Nebraska is surrounded by layers of con-
centric circles of states with more liberal or generous homestead exemptions.
247. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10.
248. NEB. CoNsT., art. I, § 16.
249. See FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 999, 89TH LEG., 2D SESS. 11790-91, 11822 (1986)(re-
marks of Sen. Hoagland and Sen. V. Johnson) concerning possible interpretations
of L.B. 999, which ultimately passed the Legislature without a conclusion con-
cerning the constitutional questions being reached. See also Edwards v. Kearzey,
96 U.S. 595 (1877)(refusing to retroactively apply North Carolina's homestead
exemption to allow recovery of property sold at judicial sale).
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B. Legislative Developments
The major legislative initiative since 1981 pertaining to Nebraska's
homestead exemption was Legislative Bill 999.250 Legislative Bill 999
was designed to prospectively help farmers who were experiencing se-
vere debt load and cash flow crises. Legislative Bill 999 was drafted
and introduced to minimize the negative impact of debt and foreclo-
sure upon Nebraska's debtor farmers.251 It was enacted into law in
1986, amending portions of sections 40-101 and 40-110 of Nebraska's
homestead exemption laws and other statutory provisions not within
the scope of this Article.
While federal law introduced Chapter 12, Adjustment of Debts of a
Family Farmer with Regular Annual Income,25 2 the State Legislature
addressed debt and foreclosure in three ways. First, Legislative Bill
999 extended the "cure" time wherein debtor farmers could "deacceler-
ate" the indebtedness on their mortgage notes and cure default,
thereby preventing foreclosure. 253 Second, the bill provided a "partial
redemption" whereby the debtor farmers could separate out up to 160
acres as a homestead from the balance of the land area which would
be subject to forced sale. If the selected parcel qualified for homestead
and the debtor could pay its fair market value, the debtor could retain
the selected homestead. 25 4 Third, it increased the value of the home-
stead exemption 25 5 and revised time lines and procedures for execu-
tion and foreclosure proceedings. 256 The increase of the homestead
exemption was almost a side issue throughout the proceedings. Origi-
nally proposed as $40,000, amendments in committee reduced it to
$20,000, and ultimately political compromises further reduced the ex-
emption to the current $10,000, as set forth in version of section 40-
101.257
250. Nebraska Legislative Bill 463 (1993) would have dramatically altered section 40-
101, but it was quickly amended. L.B. 463, 93d Leg., 1st Sess. (1993).
251. See generally J. B. Johnson, The Nebraska Legislative System: Legislative Roles
in a Nonpartisan Setting (1972)(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation University of Ne-
braska)(analyzing the rural-urban split in Nebraska legislative proceedings).
252. Bankruptcy Judges, United States Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcy Act
of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-554, 100 Stat. 308 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1201-1231 (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
253. See FLooR DEBATE ON L.B. 999, 89TH LEG., 2D SESS. 10159 (1986)(remarks of Sen.
Hoagland).
254. Id.
255. Item 2 of the explanation of amendments adopted by the committee indicated
that the Committee version of the bill to be sent to the body as a whole proposed
"the homestead exemption... is increased... to... $20,000.00 to take account of
inflation." COMmITTEE STATEMENT OF THE JUDICIARY COMITTEE, L.B. 999, 89m
LEG., 2D SESS. (1986).
256. See supra text accompanying note 253.
257. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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Debtors residing in a homestead, even when there is no equity or
when they intend to abandon the property, are forced into claiming
the homestead exemption even if it is valueless. The debtor cannot
elect to take advantage of the section 25-1552 in-lieu-of-homestead ex-
emption instead, so long as he continues to occupy the property.2 58
XI. PUBLIC POLICY AND EXEMPTIONS
A. Balancing Test and the Moving Target
English law provided for debtors prison. Some American states
continued imprisonment for debt well into the nineteenth century.259
Article 8 of the United States Constitution provides Congress the au-
thority "[t]o establish... uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States." 2 60 At the time the Constitution was
drafted, this provision was decidedly pro creditor. It lent federal
power to the apprehension of a debtor "and will prevent so many
frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed into
different States."261 While the Constitution uses the term "uniform
laws," the exemptions have descended "into utter incoherence."262
The industrial revolution and expansion of America placed a pre-
mium on the skills of the risk-taking entrepreneur. Business people,
the hapless victims of volatile capitalism, uninsured patients victim to
runaway medical expenses, 263 the divorced, the chemically dependent,
the unemployed, and yes, the occasional improvident and abuser of
credit, all find shelter in the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy provides
an orderly transition for struggling and failing businesses and
families.
Bankruptcy is designed to give discharged debtors a fresh start not
a head start. But because of geographic diversity, exemption levels
vary according to state, and range from lean and austere to comforta-
ble. Pre-bankruptcy exemption planning may include moving from a
low exemption jurisdiction to a high exemption jurisdiction. Apocry-
phal stories of forum shopping for more generous exemptions abound.
The generosity of Texas exemptions is legendary. In recent years,
258. See e.g., Hilton v. Townsend, 17 Neb. 530, 23 N.W. 509 (1885). See also In re
Nachtigal, 82 B.R. 533 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1988); In re.Wisehart, No. 94-40254
(Bankr. D. Neb. Mar. 7, 1994) (debtor cannot voluntarily waive homestead ex-
emption in bankruptcy).
259. See PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDrToRs IN AMERICA: INSOLVENCY, IM-
PRISONMENT FOR DEBT, AND BANKRUPTCY, 1607-1900 (1974).
260. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
261. THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
262. Judith Schenck Koffler, The Bankruptcy Clause and Exemption Laws: A Reexam-
ination of the Doctrine of Geographic Uniformity, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rzv. 22, 88 (1983).
263. "The truth of the matter is the leading cause of bankruptcy is medical expenses
... we don't have national health insurance." See FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 940,
86TH LEG., 2D SESS. 9393 (1980)(remarks of Sen. V. Johnson).
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Florida has been the forum of choice for personalities in financial
trouble, like Bowie K. Kuhn, Harvey Myerson, Marvin Warner, and
Martin A. Segal.2 64
In re Coplan265 provides an illustration of a Florida court's reac-
tion to forum shopping. In that case, the debtors left Wisconsin in the
wake of approximately $1,000,000 in debts, sold their Wisconsin
home, moved to Florida, and paid $228,000 in cash for their home.
One year and five days after moving to Florida they declared bank-
ruptcy. The court concluded that the move was made to take advan-
tage of the more generous Florida homestead exemption and that it
comprised fraudulent pre-bankruptcy planning and impermissible
manipulation. Although the debtors were acknowledged to be bona
fide Florida residents, the court denied the 100% homestead exemp-
tion and limited the debtors to the $40,000 Wisconsin homestead
exemption.
Attitudes regarding austerity or stinginess of exemptions are ad-
mittedly subjective perceptions of relative deprivation. When Colo-
rado recently passed an exemption for pensions, complaints were still
heard from Colorado commentators that Colorado, with a homestead
exemption of $30,000, still had limited and "meager exemptions."266
Bankruptcy operates within at least three sets of countervailing
and overlapping pressures. First, the ever present tension between
state and federal authority exists, in which states jealously tend to
preserve their autonomy in the face of federal encroachment. Second,
tension between creditor and debtor exists. Third, there is the com-
passion of society or the social policy, to rehabilitate victims of eco-
nomic or personal imprudence. Solon 267 and Deuteronomy26S
recognized the necessity of debt cutting to preserve the body politic
and human dignity.
While attorney and debtor bashing is rife, aside from anecdotal evi-
dence of abuse (frequently highlighting educated professionals), little
evidence exists that debtors flock to take advantage of liberalized ex-
emptions or rush to file cases before a narrowed exemption is imple-
mented. A major study of bankruptcy, funded in part by the National
Science Foundation and the National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development, found that "the correlation is too weak to have
any substantive impact."269
264. Larry Rohter, Rich Debtors Find Shelter Under a Populist Florida Law, N.Y.
TnMs, July 25, 1993 at 1, 12.
265. 156 B.R. 88 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1993).
266. Hyman, supra note 49, at 1, 3.
267. J.M. DENT, I PLUTARCH'S LIvEs 130 (1948).
268. Deuteronomy 15:2-3. See FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 335, 90TH LEG., 1ST SESS. 3676
(1987)(remarks of Sen. V. Johnson).
269. SuLiuv N, supra note 14, at ix, x, 233, 237. The authors criticize the grandiose
untested attempts at devising economic incentives through exemptions, an exam-
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B. Homestead
Professor Duncan observed in 1981 that time and inflation frit-
tered away the value of the homestead exemption. According to
Duncan, the "homestead exemption is increasingly ineffective as a
means of protecting the family home from forced sale."2 70 Senator
Ashford has indicated that "reasonable" homestead exemptions would
be "about $35,000,"271 or $25,000.272
The homestead exemption provisions are vague, antiquated, and in
need of revision. Case law has left the basic homestead rights intact,
but has either rejected or ignored both straightforward and creative
arguments to augment those rights. Perhaps the courts believed that
augmentation was appropriately the province of the legislature. In
any event, the solution clearly lies with the legislature.
The Unicameral should either adopt the federal homestead exemp-
tion provisions or amend the state exemption. Adopting the federal
exemption would solve a variety of problems and would create some
balance for creditors. The federal exemption scheme permits both
spouses in joint bankruptcies to claim $15,000 thereby enabling mar-
ried persons to have an increased exemption, up to $30,000 from Ne-
braska's current $10,000.273 This result favors married homeowners,
and Nebraska has already found the policy of family preservation to
be constitutionally permissible. 274
Adopting the federal exemptions would end the messy determina-
tion of which spouse is head of the household. Such arguments dis-
courage family preservation and tend to be sexist. As a matter of
policy, Nebraska has been trying to rid its statutes of sexism. 2 75
Adopting the federal exemptions would give homestead exemptions to
singles, without distinguishing widows and other categories of people.
The advantage to be gained is consistency. As creditors become na-
tional in scope, it is advantageous for them to have states that comply
with a national standard.
ple of which is the amendment in 1984 to lower the amount of"spillover" exemp-
tion available under section 522(d)(5) from $7,500 to $3,750. See Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judiciary Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 353, 98
Stat. 333 (1984). See also Working Paper 1, Bankruptcy Statistical Trends,
Michael Bork and Susan D. Tuck, Administrative Office of the United States
Court published in 6 NACTT Q. 10 (July 1994).
270. Duncan, supra note 2, at 256 n.188.
271. See FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 335, 90TH LEG., 1sT SEwS. 4531 (1987)(remarks of Sen.
Ashford).
272. See FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 335, 90TH LEG., 1ST SEss. 6366-67 (1987)(remarks of
Sen. Ashford).
273. Arguably, 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(5) as amended in 1984 would enable each debtor to
claim an additional $800 toward homestead. If so, the maximum possible home-
stead exemption would be $31,600.
274. See Landon v. Pettijohn, 231 Neb. 837, 438 N.W.2d. 752 (1989).
275. See Duncan, supra note 2, at 237, n.85, 239 n.89.
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Another option would be for Nebraska to retain its own exemption
scheme but make equitable amendments. Amendments should apply
to all homeowners and increase the exemption to an amount of
$30,000, uniformly available to all Nebraska homeowners. This
amendment would bring Nebraska more in line with its neighboring
states and reflect an appropriateness as assessed and pronounced by
Senator Ashford during legislative discussion.276
Either of these proposed alternatives would be an improvement on
the existing homestead exemption laws in Nebraska. It is time for
Nebraska to join its neighbors and protect its land and its backbone,
the citizen homeowners.
C. Motor Vehicles
An automobile is an acknowledged necessity of life. Sixteen states
and jurisdictions have adopted the federal exemptions and have a spe-
cific motor vehicle exemption of $2,400 per debtor, or higher state ex-
emptions.277 Twenty-seven states that have opted out of the federal
exemptions maintain state exemptions specifically applying to motor
vehicles. The balance of the states, including Nebraska, subsume the
automobile within a personal property exemption.
There is extraordinary wide diversity in the characterization and
the dollar amount of the vehicle exemption. At the parsimonious end,
the individual debtor in Massachusetts may take the state exemption
of $700 or if in bankruptcy, the federal exemption of $2,400.278 Mis-
souri raised its exemption in 1992 from $500 to $1,000.279 At the
more generous end of the spectrum, Alaska provides one motor vehicle
not exceeding $3,000 in value if the full value of the vehicle does not
exceed $20,000.280 Mississippi has a tangible personal property ex-
emption of $10,000.281 Kansas exempts a vehicle up to a value of
$20,000282 and Texas permits a $30,000 exemption in personal
property.28 3
In Nebraska, if the vehicle is not a tool of the trade under section
25-1556, only section 25-1552 would exempt the family automobile.
Nebraska needs a separate exemption for a motor vehicle to bring the
exemption structure and dollar amount in line with economic and so-
276. See FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 335, 90rH LEG., lST SESS. 4530, 6366 (1987)(remarks
of Sen. Ashford).
277. Minnesota and Washington allow $2,000 and $2,500 respectively.
278. MAss. GEN. LAWs ANN. Ch. 235 § 34 (16)(1986).
279. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.430(5)(Supp. 1994).
280. ALASKA STAT. § 09.38.020(e)(Cum. Supp. 1993).
281. Miss. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1 (1991).
282. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2304(c)(Cum. Supp. 1993).
283. TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 42.001, 42.002 (West Supp. 1994). Texas raised the
individual personal property exemption from $15,000 to $30,000 in 1991.
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cial reality, and it can be accomplished without interfering with sec-
tion 25-1552.
D. Cost of Living and Exemption Levels
The homestead exemption, section 40-101, has risen from $2,000 in
1879, to $4,000 in 1973, to $6,500 in 1980, and to its current $10,000
level in 1986.284 The in-lieu-of-homestead exemption, section 25-
1552, was increased from $1,500 to $2,500 in 1980.285 The specific
property exemption, section 25-1556, has not changed the dollar
amount of exemption since 1973. For sections 40-101 and 25-1552,
the legislative history reveals a relationship between a rising cost of
living, inflation, real dollar values, and the level of the exemption.2 S6
No similar application exists for section 25-1556. Fiscal updating is
periodically necessary and should be extended to section 25-1556.
A failure to apply fiscal updating is unfair to hard pressed, honest
debtors facing the specter of bankruptcy without the wider federal ex-
emptions. Rather, the continually eroding Nebraska exemptions in-
hibit the "fresh start" goal of bankruptcy. The bogey man of people
rushing to take advantage of exemptions about to be eliminated or
new lush and liberal exemptions is a fabrication and a red herring.
The dollar value of Nebraska's exemptions is about one-fourth that of
the federal exemptions.28 7
The average cost of an automobile rose dramatically from 1980 to
1994. Factoring in the presence of the secured lien and depreciation,
an automobile which would clearly fit into exempt status through the
mid-1980s has non-exempt status in the 1990s, because the exemption
allowed under section 25-1552 has not kept pace with the economy.
If COLA is an accepted national standard, and if IRS exemptions
from levy, Social Security and Supplemental Security Income benefits,
and other pensions are tied to inflation as well as to the cost of living,
and in light of federal exemptions adopting triennial review based on
the Department of Labor's Consumer Price Index for All Urban Con-
sumers, then cost of living provisions could be applied to sections 25-
1552, 25-1556, and 40-101.
284. NEB. REv. STAT. § 40-101 (Reissue 1993).
285. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-1552 (Reissue 1989).
286. Public Hearing on L.B. 901 Before the Banking Commerce and Insurance Com-
mittee of the Nebraska Unicameral, 86th Leg., 2d Sess. 39 (1980)(remarks of Sen.
Landis). See FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 940, 86TH LEG., 2D SESS. 9380, 9389
(1980)(remarks of Sen. Landis). "Neither the federal government nor most states
have taken action to raise exemption limits since the Bankruptcy Code was en-
acted in 1978. And due to inflation, exemptions reflect the value of property less
and less-especially real estate." Klein, supra note 55 at 906.
287. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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XII. CONCLUSION
Oliver Twist's plaintive request, "Please, sir, I want some more,"
was not base nor driven by greed.28 8 It was a cry for equity. Home-
stead acts foster the policy of home conservation. Personal property
exemptions are more than "in the nature of charity."289 This Article
advocates a limited enhancement of Nebraska's exemptions to con-
tinue the rehabilitative goal of the fresh start, without being handi-
capped by a false start, or unjustly enriched by a head start.
Nebraska's exemptions are widely acknowledged to be far more stingy
than thoughtfully considered exemptions under the federal Bank-
ruptcy Code. Professor Duncan saw austerity as economically benefi-
cial.2 9 0 Senator Vard Johnson favored retaining the federal
exemptions in 1980 and has repeatedly contrasted the gap between
federal and state exemptions in committee and on the Unicameral
floor.291 Other senators have called for expanding the exemptions.292
The exemption level of section 25-1556 was last addressed in 1973,
section 25-1552 in 1980, and section 40-101 in 1986. In response to
the cry of Oliver Twist, if not now, when?
288. CHARLEs DIcKENs, OLVER TwisT, Chap. 2 (1838).
289. Foster, supra note 37, at 143.
290. Duncan, supra note 2, at p. 234 n.65.
291. See supra notes 142-144,264 and accompanying text; FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 940,
86TH LEG., 2D SEsS. 9401 (1980).
292. "In my estimation, the Nebraska exemptions are too low. And the way to solve
that is for the Banking Committee to take a look this summer at an interim study
and use some comparative data and come up with a better range of exemption
limitations than what are there now." FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B. 335, 90TH LEG., 1ST
Szss. 4520, 4594 (1987Xremarks of Sen. Landis). See also FLOOR DEBATE ON L.B.
335, 90TH LEG., IsT SEss. 4529-30 (1987)(remarks of Sen. Schmit).
1994]
